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Foreword
The group of Heads of the EU Member States’ development cooperation evaluation
services and the European Commission (EU-HES) have agreed to carry out a series of
joint evaluation studies aimed at establishing the degree of application and impact, in
terms of development cooperation, of the principles of coordination, complementarity
and coherence which are enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty. An initial report was pub-
lished in 2004.1 In 2005, a series of six evaluation studies was launched, each dealing
with a specific aspect of the potential impact of the 3Cs. It is expected that all evalua-
tion studies will have been completed by the end of 2006. The studies are carried out
in a decentralized fashion, with a lead agency and a steering group being responsible
for each study as follows:
Evaluation study Lead Agency
Common Foreign and Security Policy/Development – The use of
Cotonou Partnership Agreement’s Article 96
The Netherlands
Coordination of Trade Capacity Building in Partner Countries European Commission –
EuropeAid
Coordination and complementarity in Humanitarian Assistance European Commission –
ECHO
EU Mechanisms that promote Policy Coherence for Development France
Coordination and Complementarity of Country Strategy Papers with
National Development Priorities
United Kingdom
Coordination and Complementarity of Assistance for Local Development Sweden
The evaluation on Coordination of Trade Capacity Building in Partner Countries was
managed by the Evaluation Service of EuropeAid Cooperation Office, and supported
by the Evaluation Services of the United Kingdom, France, Belgium and the Nether-
lands. This evaluation study was carried out by Aide a la Décision Economique (ADE)
and examines the extent to which the European Commission and the Member States
have achieved effective co-ordination and complementarity of Trade Capacity Building
initiatives.
1 Hoebink, P. [ed.] (2004) ‘The Treaty of Maastricht and Europe's Development Co-operation – Triple C
Evaluations No 1.’ (Amsterdam: Aksant Academic Publishers)
The overall conclusion is that TCB should be systematically integrated into the part-
ner’s poverty reduction strategy and should be treated as a priority multi-sectoral issue
in any policy discussions on economic growth and poverty reduction as well as in any
strategies elaborated on the basis of these discussions.
The study’s results are available at a timely moment where the European Commis-
sion and the Member States are considering the most effective and appropriate ways
to support developing countries in their integration into the world economy. This
publication, the fifth in the Studies in European Development Co-operation Evalua-
tion series, reports on the overall results of this evaluation study.
Eva Lithman, Chair of the EU-HES Task Force for the evaluation of the Three Cs
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Preface
This evaluation is one of a series of joint evaluation studies, initiated by the Heads of the
European Union Member States’ evaluation services and the European Commission
(EU-HES). The evaluations aim at assessing the role played by the Maastricht Treaty pre-
cepts of coordination, complementarity and coherence in European Commission’s and
EU Member States’ development cooperation policies;
The European Union is currently considering the most appropriate way to support
developing countries in their integration into the world economy. Within this framework
the EU is devising numerous trade capacity and adjustment programmes. This evalua-
tion tries to anchor this reflection into the broader development debate, in particular
regarding the need and efficiency of trade capacity building initiatives, primarily at EU
level, but also in relation to multilateral, national, regional and pluri-lateral initiatives.
The study provides valuable insights to development policy makers in the European
Commission (EC) and relevant institutions of the Member States (MS), as well as in
Partner countries.
Trade Capacity Building (TCB) includes two broad areas of assistance: trade policy and
regulations; and trade development. The evaluation, conducted under EC auspices
and in which also Belgium, France, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom were
involved, assesses the extent to which the EC and the MS have achieved effective
co-ordination and complementarity of TCB initiatives.
The evaluation focuses on Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and on the
Doha agenda period from 2001 to the present. The evaluation’s scope for assessing
co-ordination is not limited to the specific relations between the EC and MS; it also
encompasses co-ordination between EU donors (the European Commission and the
Member States) and the Partner countries or regions, where possible taking into
account aspects of ownership, harmonisation and alignment.
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Main findings indicate room for improvement
The Aide à la Décision Economique (ADE) evaluation team concludes that while internal
co-ordination of services dealing with trade-related issues in the MS and the EC have
improved, awareness of TCB issues and the capacity to address their complexity remain
limited. The evaluators acknowledge the considerable effort which has been made to
establish co-ordination mechanisms at various levels (among the agencies and services
of the same EU donor; between the EC and the MS at Headquarters level; in-country be-
tween the EC and MS). While the design of the mechanisms is adequate, in practice
co-ordination has mainly led to some improvements in information sharing and avoid-
ance of duplication but not to further benefits or results, in the absence of a prelimi-
nary consensus on co-ordination beyond this level.
Decisions on how to address TCB remain primarily in line with priorities established in
the MS or EC Headquarters. In the evaluators’ judgement this results in diverging views
between the various actors, makes coordination difficult, and produces negligible gains
in terms of transfer of information, sharing of experience, development of common
practices and procedures, and distribution of responsibilities.
The evaluation team stresses that building the trade capacity of a Partner country or
region, requires a coordinated approach that addresses the multi-sectoral dimensions
of trade policy and development in articulation with the goals of the poverty reduction
strategies and its mainstreaming into national development plans. The frequent absence
of such a focus and of successful mainstreaming practices has limited the contribution
of TCB programmes to comprehensive capacity-building for trade in Partner countries.
The ADE evaluation team believes that The Integrated Framework (IF) for Trade Related
Capacity Building for Least Developed Countries (LDC) has the potential to achieve this
systemic approach to TCB coordination. It adds however, that in order for this potential
to be realised, the framework must be enhanced so that it strengthens both country
ownership and donor commitment.
The team notes that the Integrated Framework has not met donors’ or Partners’
expectations: in most cases its first step, the Diagnostic Trade Integration Study, has
not been the starting point for funding and implementing strategic TCB interventions.
The evaluators also observed a general awareness that EU internal policies and regula-
tions have a major influence on ACP countries’ trade. In Partner countries however,
there is not much information on these policies and on their consequences. Most
TCB-related studies and seminars which aim at the Partner countries, do not focus on
EU-specific rules and policies but rather focus on TCB processes itself or on the negotia-
tion processes leading to Economic Partnership Agreements.
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I hope you will find this study useful and informative and that it helps to stimulate
further contributions to the ongoing processes to enhance coordination and harmoni-
sation in the area of development cooperation, at EU level as well as on a wider scale.
Jean-Louis Chomel,
Head of Joint Evaluation Service (common to DGs Development, External Relations
and EuropeAid)
EuropeAid Cooperation Office
European Commission
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Executive summary
Objective and scope of the evaluation (Section 1.1)
The Joint Evaluation of Co-ordination of Trade Capacity Building (TCB) in partner
countries is part of a set of six evaluation studies launched under the so-called 3Cs
(co-ordination, complementarity, coherence) Initiative. This joint exercise is being
supervised by the Group of Heads of EU Evaluation Services for External and Develop-
ment Co-operation, and managed by the Evaluation Units of the European Commis-
sion’s EuropeAid Co-operation Office and four Member States (MS), namely the
United Kingdom, France, Belgium and the Netherlands.
The objective of this evaluation is to assess the extent to which the European Com-
mission and the Member States have dedicated efforts to promoting co-ordination
and complementarity of their TCB initiatives, and how effective these efforts have
been. The evaluation focuses on ACP countries and on the period from 2001 to the
present (Doha agenda).
TCB encompasses activities that help partner countries access the rules of the Multi-
lateral Trading System (MTS), implement its regulations, and maximise the benefits
from their participation. These activities fall within two broad areas of: assistance:
trade policy and regulations; and trade development.
The evaluation’s scope for assessing co-ordination is not limited to the specific rela-
tions between the Commission and the Member States as defined in the EU treaties; it
also encompasses co-ordination between EU donors (the Commission and the MS) and
the partner countries or regions, taking into account as far as possible the aspects of
ownership, harmonisation and alignment.
The evaluation was conducted in three phases: (Sections 1.2-1.3)
The first phase entailed structuring first the approach (analytical work on the defini-
tion of TCB; analysis of the institutional context for the provision of TCB by the Com-
mission and the MS; analysis of co-ordination and the main co-ordination mechanisms
developed or used by the Commission and the MS; and an overview of the main activi-
ties of the EU donors in the provision of TCB), and second the methodology, including
reconstructing the intervention logic of the co-ordination process1; formulating the
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Evaluation Questions (EQs), Judgement Criteria and related indicators; and developing
the methods and tools to be used for collecting the information. Nine Evaluation Ques-
tions were formulated against the benchmark of the intervention logic2.
The second phase was focused on fact-finding through documentary analysis;
interviews at HQ level and in the central co-ordination mechanisms of the Integrated
Framework (IF) in Geneva; and field visits to two selected countries (Ethiopia and
Madagascar). A survey3 made possible a further broadening of the information base to
Commission Delegations and MS Representations in 49 countries; representatives of
partner countries involved in TCB activities; and members of the Joint Trade and
Development Experts Group (JTDEG, an ad hoc group of experts representing the
Commission and the MS). The evaluation faced a series of constraints, basically re-
lated (i) to the specificity of the subject under evaluation (assessment of co-ordination
as a process as opposed to conventional evaluations of programmes or policies), (ii) to
the difficulty of identifying countries for field visits and case studies, and (iii) to the
disappointing response rate to the questionnaire survey.
The third phase consisted of an analysis of the findings, a synthesis of the findings
and formulation of conclusions and recommendations.
Mechanisms of co-ordination for TCB activities (Sections 2 and 3.1)
Co-ordination of TCB activities mainly takes place at three levels:
At the wider level, co-ordination is organised through participation of the Commis-
sion or MS in the interventions of multilateral institutions. This is mainly organised
around the IF in Geneva, the Joint Integrated Technical Assistance Programme (JITAP),
and initiatives adopted under the Doha Development Agenda.
At headquarters (HQ) level, co-ordination of TCB activities between EU donors is
four-fold. First, there is co-ordination between national and Community agencies (Coun-
cil’s Working Party on Development Co-operation [CODEV]; the Article 133 Committee;
and Regional Working Groups such as the ACP Working Group, which oversees the im-
plementation of the Cotonou Agreement). None of these formal groups is specifically
geared to trade issues; at this level, only the JTDEG has a specific trade focus but at the
same time it has no formal official position. Second, there is internal co-ordination
within the respective Commission and MS Services. Third, there are co-ordination ini-
tiatives by some MS which do not necessarily involve the Commission (e.g. the Nordic
Africa Initiative). And fourth, there are regional co-ordination initiatives supported by
the Commission (context of EPA negotiations).
At field level, co-ordination is a very ad hoc process that may vary from one country
to another, depending on the number of MS represented, the presence or absence of a
Commission Delegation, the type of activities developed, the importance of TCB in
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donor aid programmes and the instruments used (see section 3.1.3 and the Country
Notes for Ethiopia and Madagascar).
Findings supporting the answers to the evaluation questions (section 3.2)
Three groups of evaluation questions (EQ) are considered:
Group 1 (EQ 1 and 2) examines the extent to which the co-ordination mechanisms
between the Commission and the MS are appropriate to achieving complementarity of
their TCB activities.
In the trade area the main co-ordination mechanism at HQ level is the Article 133
Committee. It is designed to allow the Commission to inform the MS on how it fulfils
its exclusive mandate in international negotiations and to take account of the views of
the MS when preparing its position. The work of the Committee is supplemented by
numerous informal meetings and discussions in Brussels and Geneva. The design and
the formal and informal operational procedures of the Committee and its preparatory
groups are appropriate to its objective.
In the development area the Commission and MS have individual policies. The
JTDEG was created to improve understanding of the convergence between trade and de-
velopment and to bring together actors operating in these two areas, sharing informa-
tion on the policies and activities of the MS and the Commission, and strengthening
co-ordination through the adoption of best practices and common guidelines. This ad
hoc Group is regarded as useful and necessary but its status and functioning suffer
from a number of weaknesses, in respect of:
– Participation: apart from Commission staff and a few of the more active MS repre-
sentatives, heterogeneity in participation and a lack of continuity have limited the
“blending” of the trade and development representatives;
– Provision of information: the group offers a valuable forum for exchanging views
and information, but its agenda is insufficient to ensure systematic provision of
information on the intended future activities of the participants;
– Best practice and common guidelines: the adoption of best practice is regarded as
important by several members (mainly on the Commission’s side) but has not really
been addressed by the agenda. Similarly there has been no consensus for a discussion
of the Commission’s guidelines for TRA or for a move towards common guidelines;
– Informal status: the Group’s informal status, and in particular the absence of docu-
mented records of its activities, limits follow-up on points agreed at the meetings.
At field level, where specific TCB coordination mechanisms have been set up, most
donors active in the field of TCB in the country have participated and have tried (not
always successfully) to involve the partner in discussions. This participation has also
been dependent on the relative weight of trade priorities in the PRSP, the institutional
capacity of the government to participate in discussions and the ability to identify a
responsible spokesperson for the various parties interested in the crosscutting issues
handled. The outcomes of the co-ordination efforts in the field have not been measur-
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able but the mandate of the groups concerned certainly includes information sharing,
common reviews and development of common approaches.
Group 2 (EQ 3 to 5) assesses the extent to which these co-ordination mechanisms ad-
dress the effectiveness of the co-ordination process, and how far they have been ex-
ploited to ensure economies of scale, experience sharing, improved programming and
implementation of TCB activities.
EU co-ordination mechanisms for TCB at HQ level are limited to exchanging infor-
mation on EU donor programmes and activities in TCB. Co-ordination goes little further
than this. Reticence is evident on the MS side on the adoption of common EU guide-
lines for TCB: despite the Commission’s efforts and the Council’s Communication on
Co-ordination, these Commission-designed guidelines are not taken into consider-
ation by the MS. But even at the most basic level of co-ordination, namely information
sharing, weaknesses exist: the information flow is essentially a one-way flow, from the
Commission to the MS, with low involvement of most MS. There is little information
on what is achieved in the field. There is no continuous or structured link between
HQ-based co-ordination mechanisms for TCB and corresponding in-country mecha-
nisms.
In the programming of TCB, co-ordination is not designed around a specific EU
framework, but around multilateral initiatives. Mechanisms such as the IF process, the
WTO Trust Funds and the WTO accession plans facilitate a participative and comple-
mentary approach between all participants. EU donors tend to act autonomously and,
in general, decisions on and selection of interventions by EU donors remain primarily
in line with priorities established in their own HQs or in the field, although always in
response to demands expressed by the partner. EU participation in multilateral initia-
tives (such as the IF and JITAP) is generally led by the MS rather than by the Commis-
sion. The 133 Committee is not primarily concerned with TCB although it does achieve
a EU consensus on the position to be taken on a number of specific trade-related activi-
ties (e.g. the training programmes of the WTO), while the JTDEG has engaged in discus-
sion about the objectives and management of TCB activities and to a lesser extent about
the participation of EU donors in these activities. However this has not in general led to
a consensual EU position on TCB during discussions at wider level, nor has it had much
impact on EU donor activities on the field.
In partner countries, overall co-ordination mechanisms have been developed and
successfully exploited to avoid duplication of efforts and to facilitate complementari-
ties. But in the specific area of TCB they have not matured into common programming
or provision of a common strategic response to the TCB needs of the partner. Co-
ordination on TCB activities is generally conducted at the level of donor participation
in overall co-ordination mechanisms or in more specific mechanisms. No particular
benefits are expected from specific EU co-ordination of TCB in the field. Further, in
most partner countries adequate fora for co-ordination of TCB activities have been
developed under multilateral initiatives. These take the form mainly of meetings on
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the IF agenda and meetings of working groups on private sector development (PSD) and
trade (or similar). Sharing of information on TCB activities, development of a common
understanding of these issues and allocation of tasks according to donor comparative
advantage are seen as important issues, but are inadequately addressed under the IF in
the field. Moreover, there was little indication of any allocation of responsibilities
according to donor comparative advantage in either Madagascar or Ethiopia.
Group 3 (EQ 6 to 9) assesses the extent to which EU co-ordination has led to improved
consistency and performance of TCB interventions, or to greater ownership and im-
proved partner capacity for addressing EU policy measures affecting trade.
At field level, evidence suggests that EU co-ordination has not succeeded in offering
a more consistent and coherent framework for TCB interventions. First, efforts to make
the relevant departments of the Commission Delegations and MS Representations aware
of TCB issues have not yet borne fruit. Most departments or services remain focused on
their own sectors of interest, resulting in compartmentalized assessment of TCB needs
and priorities, with no proper account taken of the cross-cutting dimension of trade
development. Second, in-country TCB co-operation between the Commission and MS
is not systematic and depends on local circumstances, projects and programmes.
The Commission is seldom perceived as the relevant level for co-ordination of TCB
activities.
Co-ordination might improve the performance of TCB activities through establish-
ment of clear common schedules for different donors; adoption of common procedures;
application of lessons learned in the country or elsewhere; and division of labour
between EU donors that reflects comparative advantages. But in practice evidence that
these potential gains from co-ordination have materialised is scarce. To the extent that
there have been gains it is mainly from the co-ordination process involving all donors
(IF; preparations for WTO accession), rather than from any specific EU co-ordination. In
the rare instances where common procedures have been adopted, these have only
partly reflected the partner’s procedures. Similarly there is little evidence that co-ordi-
nation has led to the pooling of “best practice” in any partner country. There may have
been cases where co-ordination has led to greater complementarity and avoided dupli-
cation, but this is by no means the general experience.
The extent to which co-ordination has facilitated development of a TCB strategy
endorsed by government and donors varies from one country to the other. TCB issues
are usually not a priority in general policy consultations between government and
donors. Policy dialogue in TCB suffers from unclear trade policy directions and from
the difficulty of identifying, within any given partner government, a single interlocutor
capable of mastering the crosscutting dimension of TCB issues. Moreover, the willing-
ness of partner governments to participate in such dialogue, as well as their willing-
ness to involve private sector operators, varies. The IF can help this process along by
rallying government and donors around a common understanding of the constraints
and priorities; by framing policy dialogue between donors and partner; and by contrib-
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uting to a TCB strategy that is owned by the partner, addresses its needs and priorities
and is shared and supported by the donors.
There is a general awareness that EU internal policies and regulations have a major
influence on the trade of ACP countries. However, there is an absence of information
on these policies and on their consequences. Studies and seminars conducted under
programmes defined at the wider level (IF, WTO seminars) do not focus on EU-specific
rules and policies. Efforts by EU donors have mainly taken the form of studies on the
impact of the EPA (generally viewed as insufficient in terms of quality or of involve-
ment of the partner) or of information provided to operators through various types
of PSD project. Diverse efforts have been made to develop TCB activities directed at
addressing EU policy measures. They take the form of large Commission regional
programmes focusing on helping countries comply with and adjust to SPS standards,
or of bilateral interventions by one or several donors in the same country. So far these
activities remain limited and do not seem to emanate from a co-ordinated donor view.
Conclusions (Section 4)
The overall conclusions include a synthesis of the findings and answers to the evalua-
tion questions4 and then address the policy implications for the co-ordination process.
Conclusions 1 to 4 point to the fact that considerable effort has been made to develop
co-ordination mechanisms at various levels. While the design of the mechanisms is
adequate, in practice co-ordination has not led to the expected benefits or results. It has
led to improved information sharing and avoidance of duplication but awareness of
TCB issues and the capacity to address their complexity remain limited. Moreover
co-ordination has not brought about an allocation of activities based on the respective
experiences of EU donors such as would facilitate strategic responses to the TCB needs
of partners. Conclusion 5 highlights the systemic dimension of TCB and the impor-
tance of articulating it on the goals of the poverty reduction strategy and its main-
streaming in national development plans. The frequent absence of such a focus has
limited the contribution of TCB programmes to comprehensive capacity-building in
partner countries. Conclusion 6 points to the potential of the IF as the main mecha-
nism for all donor-partner co-ordination of TCB, but also to the fact that the IF has not
met the expectations of donors and partners, while in most cases the DTIS, albeit a
valuable output, has not been the starting point for funding and implementing strate-
gic TCB interventions.
These conclusions and recommendations are derived from the analysis conducted
in the ACP context. Given, the rather generic nature of the coordination process they
may apply to a broader context. However, the extension of the conclusions and recom-
mendations beyond the scope of the evaluation, although suggested in different audi-
ences where the provisional results of this study were presented, is left to the judgement
of the reader.
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Recommendations (Section 5)
General Recommendations derived from these Conclusions are grouped in three sets,
according to their degree of importance (from 1, most important to 3, less important).
In the main text the links to the respective conclusions are systematically indicated, as
also are the identity of the actors that would be responsible for their implementation.
1° The most important set of recommendations aims at improving the integration of
TCB into poverty reduction strategies. Under this group eight operational recommen-
dations, targeted at HQ and field levels, can be encapsulated in the general recommen-
dation that TCB should be systematically integrated into the partner’s poverty reduction
strategy and should be treated as a priority multi-sectoral issue in any policy discussions on
economic growth and poverty reduction and in any strategies elaborated on the basis of these
discussions. They are as follows:
R5.1.1: The Commission and the MS need to spearhead efforts to increase awareness of
TCB as a multi-sectoral issue in their own development and trade agencies.
R5.1.2: The Commission and the MS should systematically integrate TCB into their insti-
tutions’ guidelines, whether for programming, monitoring or evaluation.
R5.1.3: Pursue the existing efforts already being undertaken to address complex trade and
development issues and disseminate the results of their work and conclusions more widely,
including to other EU donors.
R5.1.4: Increase co-ordination in the preparation of programming, monitoring or evalua-
tion guidelines.
R5.1.5: The Commission and the MS should increase their lobbying for the integration of
TCB in PRSPs.
R5.1.6: The Commission and MS should ensure that a co-ordination forum for TCB exists
in-country and in the regions where significant TCB takes place.
R5.1.7: The Commission and MS should ensure that co-ordination mechanisms produce
value added for the partner, other donors and themselves.
R5.1.8: The Commission should propose setting up financial instruments for TCB Pro-
grammes such as contribution agreements open to MS and other donor participation.
2° The main implication of conclusion 6 is that the Integrated Framework should be
strengthened, more widely spread and, where it exists, be adhered to. This forms the second
set of operational recommendations.
R5.2.1: At Headquarters level and in-country the MS and the Commission should individ-
ually and jointly make efforts to strengthen and improve the IF process and to increase its
resources.
R5.2.2: In country, DTIS studies should be used to organise TCB assistance.
R5.2.3: In order to strengthen ownership of the IF by partner countries the EU donors
should use the co-ordination process to better assess and build up the capacity of the partner to
participate in trade-related discussions and co-ordinate its own activities in this field.
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3° The five operational recommendations of the third set stem from the conclusions
pointing to a deficit of co-ordination between EU donors which tend to focus on their
respective priorities. Considering that the JTDEG is the main potential EU co-ordination
instrument for TCB at HQ level, these recommendations aim at improving its function-
ing and strengthening its role. They are:
R5.3.1: Develop the role of the Joint Trade and Development Experts Group so that it be-
comes the focal point for EU information sharing and co-ordination on multilateral initiatives
on the interface between trade and development..
R5.3.2: Draw on the expertise of the Joint Trade and Development Experts Group in the
preparation of the EU position in multilateral meetings of the Integrated Framework, JITAP,
EPA negotiations and other fora and ad hoc bodies which operate at the interface between
trade and development.
R5.3.3: The Joint Trade and Development Experts Group should be systematically used to
share information and experience on the IF.
R5.3.4: Make progress towards the production of common technical guidelines on TCB in
its various forms.
R5.3.5: The JTDEG should ensure the regular and frequent updating by the Commission
and the MS of the DAC database (the TCBDB).
Finally, two “other recommendations” are not specifically connected to any of the previ-
ous sets but are practical steps reinforcing the other efforts.
R5.4.1: In the Delegations and MS country or regional Representations, responsibilities
should be re-organised to facilitate more systematic exchanges of views, information and expe-
rience in both directions.
R5.4.2: In every trade agency, department or service a person or group should keep develop-
ment issues in view, and similarly in every development agency, department or service a person
or a group should keep trade issues in view, and these persons or groups should liaise with each
other.
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1. Evaluation framework
1.1 Purpose and scope of the evaluation
The evaluation of co-ordination of trade capacity building (TCB) in partner countries is
part of a set of six evaluation studies, each of which covers specific aspects of the 3Cs
(co-ordination, complementarity, coherence). It is a joint evaluation under the super-
vision of the Group of Heads of EU Evaluation Services for External/Development
co-operation. It is managed by the Evaluation Unit of EuropeAid and the Member
States that are actively involved are the UK, France, Belgium and the Netherlands. The
objective is to assess the extent to which the European Commission and the Member
States have dedicated efforts to promoting co-ordination and complementarity of their
TCB initiatives in the ACP countries, and how effective these efforts have been. 1
Based on this evaluation, recommendations are made on how to improve co-ordi-
nation and complementarity of TCB programmes, including attention to fostering
greater ownership among national and regional stakeholders (State and non-State
actors). The evaluation covers the period from 2001 to the present day, that is the
period subsequent to the WTO 4th Ministerial Meeting in Doha.
This report presents the final synthesis of the evaluation and is organised as follows:
the remaining part of this introductory chapter is devoted to clarifying the concepts of
TCB and co-ordination and to describing the evaluation organisation and methodology;
Chapter 2 presents the institutional context for the provision of TCB, an overview of
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Trade capacity building
1
covers assistance supporting the integration of the
partner countries into the Multilateral Trading System (MTS). It encompasses
a series of activities to help partner countries access the rules of the MTS,
implement its regulations and maximise the benefits from their participa-
tion. These activities fall into two broad categories: (i°) assistance in the area of
trade policy and regulations; (ii°) assistance in the area of trade development.
1 Annex 4 provides the common WTO/OECD/EC definition of Trade-Related Technical Assistance/Capacity
Building (TRTA/CB) and the related terminologies, Trade Capacity Building (TCB) and Trade-related Assis-
tance (TRA) and explains their meaning and coverage.
donor activities in this domain, the logic of EU donor interventions2 and concludes with a
presentation of the Evaluation Questions; Chapter 3 summarises the main findings; and
finally chapters 4 and 5 present the conclusions and recommendations respectively. 3 4 5
1.2 Evaluation organisation and methodology
The evaluation was conducted in three phases.
1.2.1 First phase: Structuring the approach
a) Analytical work to understand the institutional context, the nature of the process of
co-ordination of TCB, and the activities undertaken by EU donors:
This step involved:
– Analysis of the definition of TCB and a descriptive analysis of the institutional
context for the provision of TCB by the MS and the Commission;
– Analysis of the main co-ordination mechanisms developed or used by the Com-
mission and the MS for their TCB activities. Co-ordination takes place at different
levels: the wider6 level, for instance, WTO or Development Aid Committee (DAC) of
the OECD; Headquarters level, involving both co-ordination between the MS and
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Co-ordination is defined as: “Activities of two or more development partners
that are intended to mobilise aid resources or to harmonise their policies,
programmes, procedures and practices so as to maximise the development effec-
tiveness of aid resources. With regard to co-ordination several levels (interna-
tional, regional, national, sub-national, sectoral) can be distinguished, as well as
differences in content (policies/principles/priorities, procedures, practices) as in
intensity (consultation, co-operation, collaboration)”.
3
This definition stems from the Treaties and focuses on co-ordination between
the Commission and the Member States. Development co-operation with the
ACP countries is conducted through a partnership agreement
4
and, therefore,
the official guidelines
5
governing co-ordination between the Commission
and the MS also insist on the importance of the role of the partner (country
or region) in taking, insofar as possible, the leading role in co-ordination.
2 Throughout this whole report the term EU donors refer to the European Commission and the Member States.
3 This definition is developed in the appendix to the Terms of Reference (see annex 1).
4 ACP-EU Partnership Agreement signed in Cotonou on 23rd June 2000.
5 Guidelines for strengthening operational co-ordination between the Community and the Member States
in the field of development co-operation (Council, March 1998), and Guidelines on operational co-or-
dination between the Community and the Member States (Council, 2001).
6 Co-ordination at the wider level is relevant for this evaluation only insofar as it influences or is influenced
by co-ordination between the EU donors; otherwise it is not part of the scope of this study but will be
addressed by another evaluation.
Commission and internal co-ordination within the agencies and services of each
EU actor; and lastly in-country level7;
– In depth analysis of three specific categories of TCB - Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary
measures (SPS), Trade Facilitation, and Training for Trade/Negotiation Training -
from the point of view of their nature, the particular challenges they pose to develop-
ing countries and the response of the EU donors;
– Overview of the main activities of the EU donors in the provision of TCB in general
and more specifically in the three selected categories.
The Terms of Reference recommended focusing on an evaluation of SPS measures.
Very early in the structuring process it appeared that such a narrow focus would cre-
ate severe limitations in the fact finding phase given the difficulty in identifying a suf-
ficient sample of SPS activities simultaneously involving several EU donors in some
partner countries. Moreover, it was feared that a strict focus on SPS would not allow
the study to maintain the objective of providing an analysis of co-ordination of TCB in
general. For these reasons, the Evaluation Team recommended in the Inception Report
that the scope be broadened to the analysis of the above-mentioned three categories. The
Reference Group endorsed this recommendation. An analysis of the three TCB catego-
ries was conducted in the form of a desk study and interviews at Headquarters level8.
During the field visits, however, it emerged that co-ordination at the level of individual
categories of TCB is not very relevant for the purpose of the evaluation. Generally it
would boil down to an analysis of a few specific projects, the findings of which would
not be very different from those delivered by an analysis of co-ordination in any kind of
project, whereas the purpose of this evaluation is to derive findings specific to the
provision of TCB. Such findings are best identified through an investigation of how the
donors co-ordinate their efforts between themselves and with the partners so as to
identify the trade-related needs and then to address them systematically and compre-
hensively. At the meeting presenting the findings the Reference Group shared this
view and recommended that the evaluation focus on the specificity of TCB co-ordination
in general.
b) The development of the methodological approach:
The methodology consisted of three stages:
1 Reconstruction of the intervention logic9, that is identification, on the basis of official
documents and statements, of the objectives of the evaluated activities and the
channels of transmission between the activities and their impacts. In the present
case, the intervention logic to be reconstructed was not that of a particular project
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7 Throughout this report the term partner country covers also the partner region in case of provision of TCB
to a grouping of countries or a regional organisation.
8 See annex 10.
9 See annex 7.
or programme, nor of a policy, but of a process: co-ordination between the Com-
mission and the MS in a specific area, namely trade capacity building.
2 Formulation of the Evaluation Questions permitting the delineation and focusing of
the scope of the evaluation as well as giving a more concrete content to the tradi-
tional evaluation criteria10 to be investigated. Associated with each Evaluation Ques-
tion are one or more Judgement Criteria specifying the basis for answering it and,
finally, quantitative and qualitative indicators are identified for the validation of
each Judgement Criterion11. Nine Evaluation Questions have been formulated
against the benchmark of the intervention logic and with a view to covering all its
aspects (see box overleaf).
3 Development of the methods and tools to be used for collecting the information
relating to each indicator to validate the Judgement Criteria and answering the
Evaluation Questions.
The structuring phase was mainly conducted in Brussels in close liaison with the
Evaluation Unit of EuropeAid and the Reference Group. It involved desk studies,
an analysis of the WTO/OECD Trade-related Technical Assistance/Capacity Building,
(TRTA/CB) data base, and numerous contacts with the services of the Commission and
the Member States, some of which in their capital cities, dealing with the provision of
the TCB. Two reports were delivered and approved.12
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Evaluation Questions
EQ1: Appropriate design of co-ordination mechanisms set up at HQ level
To what extent are the mechanisms that have been set up at headquarter level to
develop co-ordination between the European Commission and the Member States,
and between the Member States, appropriate for achieving complementarity
(and coherence) of TCB activities (resource allocation, preparing common TCB
activities and facilitating programming of TCB activities)?
EQ2: Appropriate design of co-ordination mechanisms set up at partner coun-
try level
To what extent are the consultation mechanisms set up at partner country or
regional level between the European Commission, the Member States, and the
partner, appropriate to ensure co-ordination in programming and implementa-
tion of TCB activities?
10 The evaluation criteria are relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability and the degree to
which they are analysed may vary from one evaluation to another.
11 See annex 8.
12 Revised Inception Note, 16th March 2005. Revised Desk Phase Report, 1st June 2005.
1.2.2 Second phase: Fact finding
The methodology for the collection of data and the subsequent steps of the evaluation
are illustrated in the following diagram. The data to collect are indicators and sub-
questions associated with the Judgement Criteria under each Evaluation Question and
for which the most important likely sources of information have been identified a priori.
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EQ3: Achievements of Commission and MS participation in multilateral ini-
tiatives
To what extend did the Commission and MS participation in multilateral initia-
tives or in TCB activities that are organised and/or managed at a wider multi-
lateral level, achieve its expected benefits (i.e.: economies of scale, knowledge
sharing in TCB implementation, promotion of EU objectives in wider fora, optimi-
sation of EU influence in TCB activities, leverage)?
EQ4: Benefits from use of mechanisms set up at HQ level
Have the EU co-ordination mechanisms set up at headquarter level been success-
fully exploited for preparation, adoption and implementation of complementary
and/or mutually reinforcing TCB strategies and for facilitating co-ordination of
the programming of TCB activities?
EQ5: Benefits from use of mechanisms set up at partner country level
Have the consultation mechanisms set up at partner country or regional level
between the European Commission, the Member States, and the partner been
sufficiently exploited to ensure co-ordination of programming and implementa-
tion of TCB activities?
EQ6: Impact of co-ordination on programming of TCB
Does EU co-ordination lead to a more consistent and coherent framework for the
programming of TCB interventions?
EQ7: Impact of co-ordination on implementation of TCB
Does EU co-ordination lead to better performing mechanisms for the implemen-
tation of all or some TCB interventions?
EQ8: Impact of co-ordination on donors support to a TCB strategy owned by
the partner
Does co-ordination contribute to the elaboration of a TCB strategy that is owned
by the partner, addresses its needs and priorities and is shared and supported by
the donors?
EQ9: Impact of co-ordination on the partner entering the MTS
To what extent has co-ordination of TCB at HQ level and in-country helped the
partners to cope with EU policy measures that affect their trade environment, and
to negotiate effectively any new agreements?
The collection of data took place through several distinct processes:
– Documentary analysis, largely conducted during the structuring phase, but continu-
ing with new documentation collected during the field phase.
– Interviews with actors involved in co-ordination at HQ level and in the central
co-ordination mechanisms of the Integrated Framework in Geneva.
– Field visits to two countries. These were selected on the basis of a series of criteria:
- Importance of the commitments of all donors in the three specific TCB categories
according to the WTO TCBDB.
- Importance of the commitments of the EU donors in the three specific TCB catego-
ries according to the WTO TCBDB.
- Significant involvement of the Commission in TCB activities through regional or
bilateral programmes.
- Involvement of the “most active” MSs13 in selected TCB categories.
- Presence of the multilateral activities JITAP and IF.
- Participation in a regional arrangement.
In addition it was requested that the sample should include a French-speaking and
an English-speaking country. The number of countries offering a reasonable blend
of these criteria and simultaneous current operations of several EU donors14 proved
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Identification of data to collect
(Indicators/Sub-questions)
Documentary
analysis
Interviews with
actors
involved in
coodination at
HQ level
Field visits to
Ethiopia and
Madagascar
Questionnaires
A, B and C
Synthesis of fact findings
Answers to evaluation questions
Conclusions and
recommendations
13 In addition to a consultation of the TCBDB, the MS members of the Reference Group as well as Denmark
and Sweden had been approached to obtain a detailed list of their TCB activities in the three specific TCB
categories selected.
14 Since co-ordination at country level is largely an informal process it cannot be evaluated without contacts
with the actors; this is a major limitation.
very limited. The evaluation team made a few proposals and from these the Refer-
ence Group selected Ethiopia and Madagascar.
– In order to broaden the information base, a questionnaire survey15 was launched
making use of three different questionnaires targeted respectively on: A) Delega-
tions of the Commission and Representations of the MS in 49 countries; B) Repre-
sentatives of partner countries involved in TCB activities; and C) Members of the
Joint Trade and Development Experts Group.
The outputs of this fact-finding phase were presented in the two field mission reports16
and in a PowerPoint presentation to the Reference Group.
1.2.3 Third phase: Analysis and synthesis
This third phase consists of the analysis of the findings, the synthesis of the evaluation
and the formulation of conclusions and recommendations.
1.3 Limits and constraints of the evaluation
During the study a number of limitations and constraints to evaluating co-ordination
of TCB between the MS and the European Commission became apparent, all linked to
the specificity of the subject studied.
– Co-ordination of TCB is an intangible process
Unlike that of a country or sector programme, evaluation of a co-ordination process
presents peculiar difficulties when it comes to defining its object. It is a process and
it is intangible: there is thus no programme description, no identified group of activ-
ities, no targeted funding. It is possible to form a view of the activities pursued by
the Commission and the Member States in the area of TCB but even that inventory is
difficult to establish given the many limitations of the existing sources of documen-
tation and the fact that TCB activities are quite frequently partial components of
other activities such as rural development, private sector development, sectoral sup-
port and so on. Moreover, such an inventory does not provide any indication of
whether or not these activities have been the focus of co-ordination. An essential
prerequisite of the evaluation is therefore identification of existing co-ordination
mechanisms and practices.
– Co-ordination of TCB is largely informal and ad-hoc
An important finding of this evaluation is that the main co-ordination takes place in
the partner country or region but also that it is a very ad hoc process; it depends on
local circumstances, on the number of donors intervening simultaneously in the
area, on one or a few of them being accepted as main co-ordination leaders, and on
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15 Annex 9 presents the questionnaires. It explains how they have been elaborated, their contents, targeted
audience, how the recipients were identified, and analyses the responses.
16 Country Note Ethiopia, 5th August 2005.
the extent of the willingness and capacity of the partner Government to be a leading
actor. Probably the most important is the role of individuals, both in taking initia-
tives to develop, animate and maintain co-ordination mechanisms, and in establish-
ing personal contacts with other donors and partner. This means that one has to
be extremely careful with findings related to co-ordination because they can very
seldom be generalised.
– Information must largely rely on relation of individual experiences
Co-ordination is a dynamic process and a substantial part of it is informal and a mat-
ter of personal contacts or ad hoc practices influenced by local circumstances at a
given time. It therefore requires direct observation and collection of the views of the
persons who are or have been involved. This necessarily limits the depth of the anal-
ysis because the actors are not always available at the time of the evaluation, and
people who entered or started a negotiation process within the previous six months
have generally no view on the situation that prevailed before that because of the high
turnover of staff both in the donor and partner communities.
– The initial scope for observation was too narrowly focused
The evaluation was initially focused on SPS measures and the ACP countries. As
explained in a previous section, the scope has been broadened to cover all TCB
assistance. Even so it still proved difficult to analyse co-ordination of TCB activities
because comprehensive TCB programmes are either very recent or not yet developed
in ACP countries, whereas in other regions, for instance Asia or the Mediterranean
countries, there has been more emphasis on such interventions.
– The findings from the two field visits may not cover the whole range of co-
ordination cases
Given the fact that there are no large TCB programmes simultaneously involving sev-
eral donors in ACP countries and given the very ad hoc features of TCB co-ordination,
two field visits were certainly insufficient to capture all the different configurations
of TCB co-ordination and to draw lessons which can be regarded as supported by a
representative sample. Moreover, the two countries visited exhibit a number of char-
acteristics that make each a valuable case for an analysis of the co-ordination around
their TCB activities, but at the same time they are rather atypical and this constitutes
a further limitation to generalisation. Ethiopia is evolving from an autarkic regime
towards a more open policy; it is undertaking a WTO accession process, and these
endeavours are supported by various donors. However, its participation in world
trade remains extremely limited in terms both of number of products and of mag-
nitude of exports. Madagascar, after a difficult crisis, is conducting a policy very
much directed to the development of the private sector but not necessarily with a
view of promoting its trade orientation, and both trade policy and the direction of
regional trade arrangements remain confused. Both countries are part of a regional
integration grouping (COMESA) but they are not key players in it and therefore co-
ordination aspects of regional TCB, the major channel for the Commission’s assis-
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tance in this field, could not be observed adequately from the perspective of these
two countries17.
– It proved not possible to conduct in depth case studies
The evaluation team had envisaged conducting one or two case studies in the coun-
tries visited. Such studies would have entailed selection of a TCB intervention in
which several donors participated, and an analysis of co-ordination at every stage of
the cycle from inception to full completion. This proved impossible owing to the
absence of projects sufficiently advanced and with significant numbers of donors,
and to non-availability of actors involved in earlier stages.
– The low rate of response limited the value of the information extracted from the
questionnaire surveys
The questionnaire survey was developed to broaden the basis of information col-
lection and proved a valuable complement to the field visits and interviews in
Headquarters. However, the low response rates to the three questionnaires pro-
duced18 is a source of disappointment, especially to questionnaires A and C which
were addressed to identified officials of the Commission and Member States.
Although questionnaire A was particularly useful in giving a picture of the trade-
related co-ordination mechanisms existing in working countries of respondents,
and although questionnaire C contributed to gathering of valuable opinions on the
Joint Trade and Development Expert Group, the inexhaustive information col-
lected necessarily biases any further interpretation. The low rate of response to
questionnaire B is also regrettable, but was anticipated given the more difficult
identification of the recipients and the material or institutional difficulties stand-
ing in the way of a response. Further, the three completed B questionnaires proved
unusable, as several questions were not answered and the answers that were given
did not provide valuable material for the study.
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17 The initial proposal of the evaluation team had been to visit countries which served as seats of regional
integration institutions; eventually the idea was abandoned because the possible countries did not meet
sufficiently the other selection criteria. Moreover, the recent Evaluation of TRA of the Commission to third
countries and several evaluations of the regional co-operation of the Commission (among others that of
the Caribbean) have visited countries hosting regional institutions. It was considered that this evaluation
might contribute an interesting complementary view point by visiting countries more remote from the
regional seats.
18 Response rates to questionnaires A, B and C respectively 10.6%, 12.3% and 3.7% (also see annex 9).
2. TCB co-ordination process: rationale and
background
2.1 The multi-dimensions of TCB activities
The integration of the developing economies into the world economy has been a tradi-
tional objective of development co-operation policies. However, a full understanding of
the implications of the complex structure of the trade development process and, in
consequence, of the need to develop specific support strategies for Trade Capacity
Building (TCB) has only emerged gradually The Doha Ministerial Conference (2001)
stressed that technical co-operation and capacity building are core elements of the
development dimension of the multilateral trading system.
The lower right block, trade policy, requires a supportive macro-level or legal and regu-
latory framework, in which enterprises can exploit market opportunities. This deals
with trade policy elements such as tariffs, protection structures, preferences, Intellec-
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Strengthening external trade is an integrated process involving four
main dimensions, described as the “Building Blocks of Trade Capacity”:
Each of these building blocks is necessary in one degree or another
(but none is sufficient alone) for achieving successful integration of a
developing economy into the world trading system.
Productive
(enterprise) sector
development
Trade supportive
institutional
development
Capacity to
negotiate
participation in
MTS
Trade Policy
tual Property Rights (IPR), competition policy, rules for inward investment and so on
To some degree it may be extended to encompass monetary and exchange rate poli-
cies, and macro-economic and sector policies which send positive signals to operators
and encourage development of competitive trade-oriented activities.
Appropriate institutions (upper right block) are an essential and complementary
component of the development of trade capacity. They encompass specialised services
facilitating trade (export or investment promotion agencies, customs and other trade
facilitating operations, insurance services etc.) in addition to all the institutional
actors necessary to enable the private sector to participate in and benefit from market
openings in free trade.
The capacity of developing countries and regions to negotiate the rules governing the
multilateral trading system (lower left block) is another essential component of the
development of trade capacity. It implies a capacity to understand issues, rules, rights
and obligations with a view to: a) accession to the WTO and b) influencing its future
direction. A capacity for participating fruitfully in bilateral (e.g. the Economic Partner-
ship Agreements for the ACP countries) or regional arrangements falls equally within
this category. A capacity for negotiation may require the institutional development of
adequate (domestic or regional) trade negotiation machinery.
Finally the top left block, relating to strengthening of the productive sector, impacts
directly on the country’s ability to take advantage of its international trading potential,
such as diversification towards tradable goods and services, and strengthening of pro-
ductivity and competitiveness.
TCB programmes are meant to help the partner country or region achieve balanced
development of these interdependent and mutually supporting blocks. This is a chal-
lenging aim for a number of reasons:
– The systemic nature of the development of trade capacity is often not fully compre-
hended by the actors involved (beneficiaries and donors). None of the building
blocks is sufficient per se but all are necessary.
– Many trade regulations and mechanisms are diverse and technically complex.
Tariffs, SPS, customs, negotiations and so on require strong and up-to-date expertise.
– A multiplicity of actors is involved, and responsibilities are fragmented. Other
development activities are generally characterised by an easily identifiable leading
interlocutor (Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Transport, etc.). The development of
trade capacity, because of its systemic dimension and technical complexity, falls
within the responsibility of a multitude of agencies: ministries of trade, ministries
of industry, ministries of tourism, export promotion agencies, foreign trade boards,
and others.
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On the partner side there is often insufficient understanding of the full dimensions of
trade problems, and there is often more than one responsible authority dealing with
this aspect. On the donor side, trade is rarely an entry point for the programming of
aid. The Doha Development Agenda has improved awareness on these aspects.
The complexity and systemic character of trade capacity building is a powerful argu-
ment for co-ordinating activities in this field. Moreover, it involves both trade policies
(the trade policy of the partner, but also that of the donor) and development policies.
Therefore it raises, in terms of coherence and consistency, risks that co-ordination can
mitigate.
2.2 Institutional context for the provision of TCB by EU donors
The European Commission has the mandate for trade policy in the EU. According to
Article 113 of the Treaty of Rome – now replaced by Article 133 of the Treaty of Amster-
dam – the Commission is solely responsible for trade agreements negotiated in the
name of the EU and its Member States. The Commission has thus become an impor-
tant player on the international trade scene, both in terms of bilateral agreements with
countries and regions and in terms of the multilateral trading system (MTS).
The underlying principle of the original GATT, later taken over by the WTO, is that of
non-discrimination or the Most Favoured Nation (MFN). This limits the role of dis-
criminatory trade arrangements designed to assist the developing countries, though
there are important areas in which special and differential treatment is permitted
– including that through Article XXIV which specifies the situations in which regional
trading arrangements are acceptable. In addition, various forms of assistance and
trade concessions from developed countries for the benefit of developing countries
(DCs) are permitted by way of the Enabling Clause and Part IV of the GATT.
The EU has used these Articles to build up particular trading relations with a specific
set of developing countries, the ACP. Under successive Lomé Conventions and, most
recently, the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement (signed in Cotonou in June 2000) these
countries have been given privileged access to EU markets. In addition the EU has used
the Enabling Clause for its own Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) for develop-
ing countries outside the ACP group, and most recently the Everything but Arms (EBA)
scheme which gives tariff-free access to the exports of all LDCs.
In general the EU has broadly pursued the objective of an open and liberal international
trading system and is at present negotiating on that goal in the new round of develop-
ment-oriented trade negotiations launched in Doha.
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Thus for the EU trading arrangements are clearly closely intertwined with develop-
ment policy. The recent developments in EU trade policy clearly reflect its view that
trade policy should be considered and designed as a means to increasing the wealth,
growth and economic prosperity of the developing world. This is demonstrated by its
increasing concern to mainstream trade into development.
The EU considers trade-related technical assistance and capacity building (TRTA/CB) a
major instrument for mainstreaming trade into development. At the bilateral level,
the Commission has launched and implemented a number of TCB projects aimed at
increasing the importance of trade in bilateral and regional programmes. At the multi-
lateral level the EU has become a leading contributor to the WTO Doha Development
Agenda (DDA) Global Trust Fund, which is a key source of financing for TCB interven-
tions. At the same time it has also strongly promoted co-operation between TCB provid-
ers, in particular with the Bretton Woods institutions, by supporting the Integrated
Framework (IF) for TCB for LDCs.
The EU has emphasised three main goals for trade policy, and for TCB, insofar as they
relate to the developing countries: poverty reduction, sustainable development and
integration of those countries in the MTS.1 In addition, consistent with these goals, the
Commission seeks to integrate TCB interventions progressively into its development
assistance programmes, mainly through the process of Country and Regional Strategy
Papers (CSPs and RSPs).
In Annex 5 the objectives and main orientations of the Commission and the Member
States in the fields of TCB are reviewed. Emphasis on particular objectives may differ
across the MS: for example, for one donor, it might be regional integration and, for
another, concentration on reducing poverty. But one may conclude from the sources
consulted that the overall objectives of TCB2 are shared by the MS, in particular:
– the importance of integrating trade policy into development and poverty strategies;
– the importance of building the necessary institutional mechanisms and institu-
tion-building capacities, in both physical and human resources;
– the importance of assisting partner countries in preparation for negotiations, and in
their understanding of their rights and obligations under the MTS; and
– the importance of helping these countries develop the necessary competitiveness
and sector policies for participation in the MTS.
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1 See, for example, the positions adopted at the Monterrey Conference (March 2002) on financing for
development, the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg (August 2002)
and in the meetings associated with the DDA.
2 A comprehensive analysis of the intervention logic of the trade-related assistance provided by the Euro-
pean Commission can be found in section 2.3 of the Final Report of the “Evaluation of Trade-Related
Assistance by the European Commission in Third Countries” (ADE, June 2004).
While the Commission covers an extremely wide range of operations across the dif-
ferent regions of the world, the MS are often more focused on particular developing
countries or on specific regions or themes. Regional focus is generally influenced by
the historical relationships with the beneficiaries. In terms of trade-related assistance
a few points may be highlighted:
– the Commission and all MS insist on the importance of the principles of partnership
and ownership;
– some MS express preferences for intervening in trade through the multilateral
initiatives such as the IF, the JITAP, the WTO Trust Fund;
– in trade-related areas some MS have a fairly ambitious and comprehensive strategy
addressing many aspects of TCB whereas others tend to focus on specific issues;
– all the MS reviewed in Annex 5 insist on the importance of supporting partners’
capacities to negotiate their participation in the MTS in their own best interests.
2.3 Overview of TCB activities of EU donors
Annex 6 presents a broad view on TCB donor-funded activities worldwide. It is based on
data extracted from the Trade Capacity Building Data Base of the WTO/OECD (TCBDB).
This database is the only comprehensive source on TCB donor-funded activities. It
provides quantitative information on trade-related technical assistance and capacity
building (TRTA/CB) projects in developing countries or regions, supported by bilateral
donors and multilateral or regional agencies, over the period 2001-2003. The informa-
tion only gives an order of magnitude as it suffers from several limitations. One of the
main limitations is that substantial assistance in the selected categories is provided
through development projects which are not necessarily or typically categorised under
‘trade development’ whereas they (or large sub-components of them) do have trade
development characteristics (for instance SPS in agricultural projects): these activities
might not be reported in the TCBDB. Similarly, interventions via the multilateral Trust
Funds are not categorised in the database.
Table 1 provides a synthesised overview of total TCB Commitments over the period
2001-2004. It shows that the major part of donor assistance (65%) is directed to trade
development. The EU donors are contributing about half of the total commitments.
This relative share is the same in the three groups trade policy and regulations, trade
development, and contribution to the Trust Funds; but within trade policy and regula-
tions the EU donors are particularly important providers of assistance in SPS whereas
they are relatively less prominent in trade training and training in trade negotiation
techniques.
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Table 1 Commitments on TRTA/CB (2001 to 2004)
Commitments in US$ million Distribution
by category
(all donors)
Share of EU
donors in
each
category
EU Donors Commission EU MS Other Donors Total Donors
Trade Development 3 457 2 265 1 191 3 461 6 918 68,3% 50,0%
Trade Policy &
Regulations
1 553 1 268 285 1 499 3 053 30,2% 50,9%
Contribution to TCB
Trust Funds 3
72 1.7 70 79 152 1,5% 47,6%
Total commitments
on TRTA/CB
5 083 3 535 1 547 5 041 10 124 100% 50,2%
Source: Doha Development Agenda Trade Capacity Building Database (TCBDB).
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Trust Fund.
3. Main findings
This chapter presents the findings on co-ordination mechanisms collected through the
desk study, interviews with participants at EU Headquarters and in Geneva, the field
visits and the questionnaires. It is divided into two sections. A first section presents the
main co-ordination mechanisms at the various levels and information on how they are
used. It covers elements of both background and findings as the two aspects could not
be disentangled. It is focused on the interfacing of EU donors with these different
mechanisms, most of which involve other actors as well. The second section regroups
the main findings to substantiate the judgement criteria and present the synthetic
answer to each Evaluation Questions.
The background material on the main existing co-ordination mechanisms presented in
the Inception Note has been enriched with the information received from interviews
(including the field visits) and questionnaires.
3.1 Mechanisms of co-ordination for TCB activities
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Co-ordination of TCB activities mainly takes place at three different levels:
– the so-called “wider level”: participation of individual donors (bilateral or
multilateral) in efforts organised and managed by a multilateral institu-
tion (Integrated Framework, JITAP, OECD/WTO);
– the headquarters level: co-ordination of TCB activities among EU donors
(between the Commission and MS; between MS) or co-ordination inter-
nal to each EU donor; and
– the partner country level: coordination between MSrepresentations and
EC Delegations in the field, with the partner and with non-EU donors.
3.1.1 The “wider level”: co-ordination of participation of Commission and/or MS to
interventions of multilateral institutions
a) The Integrated Framework (IF)1
The IF is a process in which six multilateral agencies (IMF, ITC Geneva, UNCTAD, UNDP,
World Bank and WTO) and seventeen donors currently participate. It seeks:
(i) to “mainstream”, or integrate, trade into the national development plans such as
the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) of least developed countries; and
(ii) to assist in the co-ordinated delivery of trade-related technical assistance in response
to needs identified by the LDCs. The IF is built on the principles of country owner-
ship and partnership.
The IF’s donor-financed trust fund consists of two windows: Window 1 finances the
DTIS (up to US$300.000 per country) and Window 2 bridges the period between the
approval of the DTIS and the start of donor interventions to implement the priority
action matrix (up to US$1m per country).
Apart from the financing provided to the Trust Fund, the Commission and the MS par-
ticipate in the Integrated Framework at central level via the managerial and governing
bodies of the IF:
– The IFWorking Group (IFWG) is the managerial body of the IF: it deals with specific
issues including day-to-day operations and prepares decisions on the use of the
Window I and II funds. It then submits them to the IF Steering Committee (IFSC).
The IFWG is made up of the six multilateral agencies, two donor representatives and
two LDC representatives; the latter 4 representatives rotate on a six-monthly basis.
– The IF Steering Committee (IFSC) oversees and governs the IF process: it decides on
policy issues, considers contextual issues for the IF and approves or endorses the
decisions put forward by the IFWG. It also disseminates among members informa-
tion on the work of the IFWG with a view to mobilizing donor interest and funding.
All WTO members and observers can participate in it.
Both IFWG and IFSC are supported in their activities and deliberations by the IF Secre-
tariat (located within the WTO).
Intensive informal donor co-ordination is usually ongoing and a non-EU-specific2
donor meeting is held in advance of the IFSC meeting. The Commission does not auto-
matically represent the MS and no MS is mandated to express the voice of the others in
these meetings. Equally, LDCs prepare the IFWG and IFSC meetings in advance among
themselves through the LDCs Group and Africa Group. These informal meetings basi-
cally focus on defining consensus prior to tripartite meetings.
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2 EU-specific co-ordination around the IF and the WTO is depicted in 3.2.3 (answer to J3.1).
The Commission – whether or not with the active support of the MS – has links with
the other Quad States (the US, Canada and Japan) in a number of activities under the IF
umbrella including the special roundtables in interested LDCs3.
b) Joint Integrated Technical Assistance Programme (JITAP)
The JITAP mobilizes the expertise and support of the WTO, UNCTAD and the ITC to help
African country partners benefit from the new Multilateral Trading System. It is the
first programme that the three organizations have established to deliver jointly a broad
range of selected technical assistance inputs to a number of countries simultaneously,
focusing mainly on capacity building. Currently 16 countries are benefiting from the
programme, a majority of which are LDCs, and 13 donors contribute to its funding. The
total JITAP II programme budget is US$12.600 million4.
A high-level workshop was held in Geneva in 2004 for beneficiary countries and African
sub-regional groupings on MTS capacity building and regional integration in Africa5. In
the discussions on Challenges of the MTS and EPA Negotiations for African Regional
Economic Communities, all the major issues raised related to problems of co-
ordination, for example:
– ensuring consistency in various negotiating for a; it remains a major challenge
to ensure that positions adopted at MTS level complement those at regional and
bilateral levels;
– institutional co-ordination to harmonize country and regional positions;
– ensuring that positions adopted at multilateral level do not contradict regional and
bilateral initiatives;
– JITAP activities need to involve the RECs more fully in capacity building activities,
particularly at sub-regional level.
c) OECD/WTO
Further to the 4th WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha, a series of initiatives were
adopted under the Doha Development Agenda to increase TCB funding for developing
countries, such as the Doha Development Agenda Trust Fund, and to monitor the
delivery of donor-funded TRTA/CB, in particular the TCBDB managed by the DAC of the
OECD
6. The latter instrument includes implementation of commitments registered in
the Doha Ministerial Declaration and aims to assist the development and trade policy
communities in sharing information and achieving higher degrees of co-ordination
and coherence. Unfortunately the TCBDB is far from comprehensive, owing to the fail-
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3 WTO, General Council, Committee on Trade and Development, Sub-Committee on Least-Developed
Countries, Integrated Framework Steering Committee, Trade-Related Technical Assistance And Capacity
Building, Communication from Canada, European Communities, Japan and the United States
WT/GC/W/440, WT/COMTD/W/88, WT/COMTD/LDC/W/20, WT/IFSC/W/1, 31 July 2001
4 Source: JITAP Progress report (1 November 2003 to 30 April 2004).
5 The UK was the only EU participant to this conference.
6 Also see Annex 6 “Overview of TCB activities of the Commission and the MS” based on the TCBDB.
ure of a number of donors – including a number of EU donors – to keep it up to date
with their various programmes.
3.1.2 Co-ordination of TCB activities among EU donors at Headquarters level
a) Co-ordination between national and community agencies
The various co-ordination groups among the national and community agencies include7:
– The Council’s Working Party on Development Co-operation (CODEV), which poten-
tially deals with trade and development issues among other development matters.
– The Article 133 Committee which co-ordinates commercial agreements between the
Member States, formulates common positions on commercial policy and informs
MS on the evolution of EPA negotiations. It deals only marginally with trade-related
assistance, for instance when preparing the common position and funding of the
Commission and Member States in relation to the WTO TRTA programme.
– The ACPWorking Group which oversees the implementation of the Cotonou Agree-
ment in all its dimensions, including the trade-related aspects.
None of these three formal groups is specifically geared towards trade issues. At this
widest level, only the Joint Trade and Development Experts Group, an ad hoc group of
experts representative of the MS and the Commission (see below) has a specific trade
focus but no official formal position.
b) Intensification of internal co-ordination
Within the Commission and MS a growing awareness of the complexity of the links
between trade, development and poverty reduction is creating a climate of opinion
favouring closer co-ordination of internal services and development of comprehensive
programmes.
Within the Commission8, specific procedures exist for fostering this closer co-operation
between services such as those implemented through the Inter-service Quality Sup-
port Group which ensures that minimum standard requirements and harmonized
formats and procedures are used for the design of country and regional strategy
programmes; or through the Thematic Inter-Service Task Forces, which bring together
people from various services addressing similar issues in different perspectives with
the aim of sharing information, developing harmonised approaches, and improving
practices. For example, the Interservice Taskforce on Trade and Development holds
monthly meetings with representatives of DGs dealing with trade and development
issues (mainly the Relex family and DG Trade). The Interservice Steering Group on
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures in Third Countries pursues internal coordination
among all DGs dealing with SPS measures in the area of development (see box next page).
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Furthermore the Commission also fosters links between trade and development through
the Joint Trade and Development Experts Group which is a forum, chaired by DG Trade,
for exchanging information between experts of the Commission and the different MS
on their respective TCB policies and activities, with the objective of bridging the gap
between trade and development.
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Internal co-ordination on SPS matters: The case of the Interservice Steering
Group on SPS related issues for Developing Countries
Source: Taskforce on Trade and Development – Thematic Review, Sanitary and Phytosanitary
measure (December 2004).
To the initiative of DGs DEV, TRADE and SANCO, this Group was created
mid-2003. It aims to better coordinate development, trade and consumers’
protection issues, for ensuring coherence, co-ordination and complementarily.
The Group – extended to DGs RELEX, AIDCO, RTD, AGRI and ENV – meets
regularly with the objective to anticipate issues and propose solutions in the
field of SPS.
The Group is built up (i) to enable interaction in the Commission’s head-
quarters on SPS issues discussed at multilateral level (in the CAC, the OIE
and the IPPC), and (ii) to ease transfer of information on these SPS issues to
the field level (EC Delegations).
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Within the administration of all the MS consulted there is also a growing awareness of
the need for the respective departments in charge of development, trade and other
related issues to co-operate, co-ordinate and exchange experiences on trade-related
issues so as to maximise effectiveness. An example of these internal co-operation de-
velopments is the French Programme de Renforcement des Capacités Commerciales
(PRCC) established jointly by the Direction des Relations Extérieures (DREE) of the
Ministry of Economy, Finance and Industry and the AFD to share skills between the
institutions and break down the barriers between trade and development issues.
c) Co-ordination initiatives by Member States
More widely, some MS documents point to the development of various forms of privi-
leged co-operation between particular groups of donors for specific activities or themes.
For example, in its 2003 main policy document on aid co-operation9, the Netherlands
stress the importance of establishing partnerships with other donors beyond the tradi-
tional circle of like-minded countries: on trade issues, the Netherlands expect to work
more closely with France whilst on general issues (notably poverty reduction) the United
Nations will be a key partner. In terms of harmonisation, the Netherlands are closest to
the “Nordic +” group of countries (Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Norway, Sweden and
the United Kingdom), which it joins wherever possible (alliances with other donors
being sought only there where the Nordic + group of donors have very limited or
non-existent presence). The Nordic Africa Initiative, adopted by the Ministers for Trade
in 2003, aims at strengthening dialogue on trade and development with a number of
African Countries10.
d) Regional Co-ordination initiatives by the Commission
In the ACP countries, the Commission’s trade-related assistance is mostly conducted
through its regional and “all ACP” programmes, which are usually channelled through
the regional integration institutions.
Under the Cotonou Agreement regional co-operation is taking on a new dimension
with the start of the EPA negotiations, on the one hand, and the introduction of new
financing mechanisms in the regional programmes of the 9th EDF, on the other.
The EPA negotiations are the responsibility of the Commission, and the MS are
informed by DG Trade on their progress through the 133 Committee. TCB aspects of EPA
are not discussed by the 133 Committee but by Regional Preparatory Task Forces, cre-
ated in each negotiating region and mandated to follow up technical negotiations,
identify capacity-building needs and select projects covering those needs. These Task
Forces include representatives of the Commission and of the partner regions (authori-
ties and civil society). MS participate ex ante in these Task Forces through preparatory
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10 Source: http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/4729
informal meetings attended by MS headquarters representatives (whereas the ordinary
133 Committee mostly involves staff from the permanent MS representations in Brussels).
The EPA negotiation exercise is still at a very early stage. The most advanced case con-
cerns the Caribbean region where the Task Force is preparing an inventory of the avail-
able studies and programmes in the area of TCB.
Regarding regional programming under the 9th EDF, the novelty is that as far as possi-
ble implementation of the regional programmes will be managed via Contribution
Agreements (CA). A CA is an agreement signed between the Commission and a
regional integration organisation that permit the latter, under certain conditions, to
disburse the funds (for programming and implementation purposes) on the basis of
its own procedures11. The main conditions imposed by the Commission are that the
regional partner should (i°) have a clear strategic multi-annual programme, and (ii°)
submit to an institutional and financial audit to verify that its financial management
capacity is adequate.
Both of the new dimensions – EPA negotiations and use of Contribution Agreements
in regional support – impact on the relationship between the Commission and the
partners rather than on the triangular Commission-MS-Partner co-ordination. Never-
theless, they offer an interesting potential for a broader policy dialogue involving the
Commission, the Partner and also the Member States in the programming and imple-
mentation of TCB at regional level.
3.1.3 Co-ordination at country level
International agencies such as the World Bank, IMF, UNCTAD, UNDP, UNEP, ITC, WTO,
WCO, WIPO, ILO, and regional banks like the Inter-American Development Bank and the
African Development Bank, are increasingly stressing the importance of trade-related
assistance and capacity building. Furthermore many bilateral donors, including some
EU Member States, are very active in the area of trade and development.
The Commission has reported – albeit five years ago – on in-country co-ordination
mechanisms12. In practically all countries there are several donors present other than
the Commission and the MS, such as the World Bank, the UN agencies, the Develop-
ment Banks and so forth, which have also set up specific co-ordination mechanisms
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11 CA are not a new instrument but rather a legal mechanism that was mainly used to fund activities chan-
nelled through international organisations, like the UN agencies e.g., without superposing the use of the
Commission’s procedures to that of these agencies. More recently, the mechanism has been suitable and
convenient also to fund regional organisations benefiting form Commission’s support.
12 Report from the Commission, Operational co-ordination between the Community and the Member States
of the European Union in the field of development co-operation, Brussels, 01.03.2000, COM(2000) 108
final.
open to all donors. To quote the Commission report: “The most important are the Con-
sultative Groups set up by the World Bank and the Round Tables set up by the UNDP,
in which EU members actively participate. In two-thirds of the sectors considered prior-
ities by EU members, one or more non-EU donors are also active. In just over 40% of all
priority sectors a co-ordinator has been chosen, as follows: in 25% of cases the partner
country acts as co-ordinator; in 25% an EU Member State acts as co-ordinator; in 15%
the EC Delegation is the co-ordinator; in 15% the World Bank is the co-ordinator; in
15% UN agencies act as co-ordinator, and in 5% of cases, another donor acts as co-
ordinator.” The “relatively” active role played by the partner at sector level has probably
increased since 2000. How these various roles have changed over the last five years
will be examined at a later stage.
The data in the above report show the links established by each member of the EU with
other donors present in the country, for each country and each sector. It shows, for
example, that EU members’ co-ordination with the UNDP and the World Bank takes the
form of meetings in almost 85% of cases. The average level of co-financing is 21% with
the World Bank and 39% with the UNDP, which is respectively roughly twice and three
times as high as co-financing between EU members (12%).
Co-ordination in the field is a very ad hoc process that may vary from one country to
the other depending on the number of MS represented, the presence or not of a Com-
mission Delegation, the type of activities developed, the importance of TCB as a share
of the donor’s aid programme and the instruments used. In all countries where a Del-
egation is represented it organises regular (at least monthly) meetings with the MS.
Co-ordination in the field fulfils several functions: ensuring mutual exchanges of
information, developing common awareness of the partner’s needs, and achieving
varying degrees of co-ordination of programming and implementation of activities
throughout the project cycle. The following paragraphs present the co-ordination mech-
anisms that could be observed in Ethiopia and Madagascar during the field visits:
a) Ethiopia
Donor co-ordination mechanisms
Donor co-ordination mechanisms in Ethiopia are extremely well developed and cover
the full range from donor-donor consultations to government-donor dialogue, and
from general consultations to specific sector or sub-sector level consultations.
The Development Assistance Group (DAG), co-chaired by the UNDP and WB, regroups
all donors active in Ethiopia and meets on a monthly basis; it is a forum for donor con-
sultation, information sharing, organisation of joint reviews and missions and prepa-
ration of common views on policy issues. In addition to this ambassador level forum,
technical working groups of interested donors have been formed under DAG to address
specific sectors or multi-sector themes in which these donors are active. These working
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groups are animated by donor representatives active in the sector or theme and are,
with the exception of that for budget support, not permanent.
One such working group has been formed for Private Sector Development, to which
Trade was added in 2004. The addition of trade to the working group was warranted by
the fact that, in a short space of time, trade has become an important issue in Ethiopia
and donors have become more active in this field. The PSD&T working group has, in
addition, initiated a number of cluster groups which focus on specific aspects of pri-
vate sector development and trade such as women entrepreneurs, certification, or WTO
accession. The cluster groups work at practical level on technical problems arising in
project or programme implementation. The discussions at working group level tend to
focus on more general matters involving policy and strategy. The focus has primarily
been on sharing information about each other’s programmes rather than discussing
priorities for assistance, agreeing on allocation of tasks or sharing of experiences. The
PSD&T is chaired by the EU and meets once a month for a couple of hours.
Specific co-ordination efforts between the Commission and its MS take place in addition
to the general co-ordination mechanisms described above under DAG. They include the
regular meetings of the Commission and Heads of MS missions, the good governance
and democracy programme of the Commission and MS, and the biannual meetings with
the government to review progress with indicators in the context of budgetary support.
Mechanisms for Government-donor consultations
The consultations between the donors and the Ethiopian authorities take place at
different levels. Consultative Group Meetings (CG) are held every two years. On an
annual basis the Government of Ethiopia organises the annual PRSP review which is
the framework within which all donors provide their support to Ethiopia’s poverty
reduction strategy. The PRSP reviews are the opportunity for establishing a broad policy
dialogue, including trade-related issues. There is also a continuous dialogue through
the High Level Forum where, on a quarterly basis, a policy dialogue between the DAG
and the government takes place.
In addition to these general fora for policy discussions, sector wide reviews are organ-
ised for some sectors where donors (and typically the same people who participate in
the technical working group) can discuss sectoral issues with the government. For
trade the question is more delicate because of the nature of the issues which cut
across different sectors: so far the PSD&T working group has had difficulty in setting
up a forum for policy discussions on trade with the government because the various
ministries potentially responsible (trade, industry, agriculture etc.) have been unable
to agree on who should participate. Trade issues have thus been discussed at more
general levels, during either the annual PRSP reviews or the budget support discussions.
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Outcomes of the existing mechanisms
At the widest level, the DAG co-ordination mechanisms have enabled donors to develop
common views on general policy matters. At the technical level, the working groups
and cluster groups have facilitated sharing of information and, to some extent, alloca-
tion of responsibilities between different donors in such fields as quality, standards
and accreditation and SPS.
Specifically in the area of trade-related interventions and TCB, despite an existing diag-
nostic study having been undertaken in the context of the IF, donors seem to have
aligned their interventions more on their own priorities than on those established by
the DTIS: co-ordination might thus have had more impact in terms of avoidance of
duplication of intervention areas through better communication and information flows
between donors than it has had on rallying the government and donors around a com-
mon approach and a common set of priority areas to be tackled. In this respect, the
allocation of tasks to assist in WTO accession has been more successful.
The co-ordination mechanism set up under the PSD&T working group has not yet
succeeded in breaking down the barriers between itself and the other working groups.
In this respect the PSD&T WG is mirroring what is happening within the government
services and at the donors’ HQ and in-country representations, in that trade is failing to
become a real multi-sectoral topic with awareness of trade aspects in all productive sectors.
The efforts made at intensifying internal co-ordination between the different services
(see 3.1.2 a above) have not yet had a conclusively positive impact at in-country level.
This lack of internal co-ordination and the lack of perspective it creates, as well as the
failure to define a clear trade policy and to issue the right signals in favour of trade, has
impeded government participation in the PSD&T discussions which remain largely a
donor-driven exercise.
b) Madagascar
Co-ordination of TCB mainly works through the IF framework for which the WB is the
facilitator. The focal point for donor co-ordination in TCB is the annual review of the
Poverty Reduction Strategy (DSRP), which is organised by a technical secretariat13. Al-
though donors do not participate in the DSRP technical monitoring committee which
convenes quarterly, they are invited to the yearly DSRP Review meeting with all the
technical ministries.
Outside this, the majority of government-donor consultations work through bilateral
exchanges but there are a limited number of donors in Madagascar – particularly of
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those with TCB interventions.14 Even within TCB therefore, donor-donor and govern-
ment-donor co-ordination remains a bilateral exercise dependent upon each partner’s
willingness to share information or co-ordinate more intensively. The general view
held by government and donors is that information circulates well and that everyone is
adequately informed about others active in the same field.
Nevertheless the government is in the process of trying to establish a new forum for
discussion (the CIMEM) bringing together the government, Malagasy stakeholders
(mainly from the private sector) and donors on the subject of Madagascar’s integration
into the world economy. Madagascar has a strongly established practice of consultation
between government and private sector stakeholders and the CIMEM appears to be the
first example of extending this to the donor community.
Thus co-ordination between EU donors and with other donors takes place, informally
but regularly. It leads to information sharing and permits avoidance of duplication of
efforts. Indeed there are several examples of close co-ordination and complementarities
between a limited number of donors (for example France and the Commission or the
EIB;, France and the US) around particular projects. Co-operation of a technical nature
takes place between all donors and the government involved in specific activities. Co-
ordination between donors and with the partner government is well developed in such
areas as budget support (the Cadre de Partenariat pour l’Appui Budgétaire), environ-
ment and education.
However, none of these focuses on trade-related and TCB issues. The mechanisms of
dialogue on trade-related issues between the donors and the Government are in princi-
ple designed to give the Government the leading role. Besides the general mechanisms
chaired or co-chaired by the government and involving all donors, such as the monitor-
ing committee of the IF, technical co-ordination mechanisms for specific donor-funded
programmes always involve the government, private sector stakeholders and donors.
Notwithstanding the relatively high degree of mutual information and consultation
between the government, the donors and the stakeholders, there is no formalised pro-
cess of overall co-ordination and policy dialogue on trade-related issues and TCB. The IF
framework has been weak following the formal validation of the Diagnostic Trade Inte-
gration Study (DTIS) at the end of 2003. Subsequent workshops have not resulted in
additional development assistance or in a convergence of donor efforts to fill the gaps
in the trade integration priority actions matrix. This has been largely because donors
have their own programmes, which may fit ex post in the priority matrix but have not
been designed to support the underlying strategy. The trade integration study and
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14 There is a more formal co-ordination system for rural development. A donor grouping (GBF) with a
secretariat1 was set up in 1997 mainly to support environmental activities and later (2000) enlarged to
encompass rural development and food security activities.
matrix therefore are not a strategic instrument for co-ordinating donor and govern-
ment activities. Secondly for the government TCB dimensions are a less central focus,
the capacity of the government to design and manage trade capacity building being
very limited and dispersed through different administrations.
The Secrétariat Multi-Bailleurs (SMB) has worked well for the environment and might
have been useful for TCB but it has not been fully exploited by the donors, mainly
because of a lack of confidence in its independence and because some donors view it as
too dominated by the WB. Also communications between different government agen-
cies are particularly poor.
The weakness of TCB co-ordination has meant that there has been:
– insufficient coverage of a number of priorities identified in the diagnostic study of
the IF;
– insufficient preparation of Madagascar’s position in important approaching interna-
tional and regional negotiations. For example Madagascar has not yet defined its
position either on the GATS negotiations or on fisheries in the context of the EPA,
although on this latter topic it is the leader among the ESA group of countries;
– there is disappointment in this regard with the seminars and training provided by
the donors. These sessions do not achieve their objectives because they are too short
and of little practical use.
This mismatch between the needs and what is provided reveals a double failure of
co-ordination: lack of internal co-ordination leading to inappropriate selection of par-
ticipants; and lack of donor-partner co-ordination in designing training more targeted
on helping the partner develop an operational capacity to define its negotiation posi-
tions. A constructive triangular relationship between Government, private sector stake-
holders and donors is needed to design and implement TCB supportive of coherent
trade-related policies. It is a complex area in terms of its problems and of the number
of actors involved, and therefore a more difficult area in which to achieve effective
co-ordination than in other fields (for instance budget aid or education).
In the past Madagascar has experienced an interesting instance of successful co-
ordination on trade-related issues: the Cross Border Initiative. It led to a substantial
package of trade reforms combined with financial and business-related reforms. So far
the IF, which can be regarded as an even more comprehensive endeavour in the area of
TCB (but limited to a single country) has not attained similar achievements.
It should be noted that EU co-ordination, that is co-ordination between the Commis-
sion and the Member States, is not a key issue because trade is largely a multilateral
issue and problems have to be co-ordinated at least at the level of the IF.
Main findings 49
3.2 Findings supporting the answers to the Evaluation Questions
3.2.1 Evaluation Question 1: Appropriate design of co-ordination mechanisms set up at
HQ level
The intervention logic15 points to typical co-ordination activities, as set out in the pre-
scriptive guidelines on co-ordination between the Commission and the MS, as being an
essential prerequisite for achieving a series of operational objectives in the area of
co-ordination. This Evaluation Question focuses on co-ordination at headquarters level
and analyses which mechanisms have been developed and whether their design and
mode of operation is appropriate to achieving the intended objectives at this level of
co-ordination. It also examines whether these mechanisms address the appropriate-
ness of the EU resources allocated to TCB.
Co-ordination at Headquarters level includes both the mechanisms internal to each EU
donor for co-ordinating activities between its various trade and development services,
and the mechanisms to organise co-ordination between EU donors. They have been
described in section 3.1.2 above.
Two Judgement Criteria have been formulated to answer this question.
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Evaluation Question 1
To what extent are the mechanisms that have been set up at headquarter level to
develop co-ordination between the European Commission and the Member States,
and between the Member States, appropriate for achieving complementarity
(and coherence) of TCB activities (resource allocation, preparing common TCB
activities and facilitating programming of TCB activities)?
Key findings:
– Increased efforts from the Commission and the MS to coordinate own
respective trade and development services.
– At HQ level the Joint Trade and Development Expert Group (JTDEG) is the
main instrument to deal with TCB aspects and complements the formal
trade specific and development specific mechanisms that cover TCB only
incidentally.
– The JTDEG gathers Commission and MS representatives with the aim of
improving convergence between the trade and development aspects.
However, interaction between [rather active] Commission and [some-
times passive] MS representatives is insufficient to move from exchange
of information into real coordination.
15 See annex 7, in particular the lower layer of diagram 1.
J.1.1 The mechanisms (co-ordination committees, consultation procedures, working groups,
etc.) are designed so as to facilitate the sharing of information, the appropriate allocation
of resources to TCB, the adoption of best practices in the sphere of TCB and the develop-
ment of common and/or complementary approaches.
The Commission as well as the MS have devoted internal efforts to developing informa-
tion exchange and improved co-ordination within their own trade and development
services involved in similar or complementary activities (for example organisation of
systematic liaison between trade, development and agricultural departments on SPS
measures; or between development, trade and domestic industry and services on
export promotion activities, etc.). This awareness of the need for such internal co-
ordination has been stimulated by the commitments made at Doha and has become
more and more acute. The thematic task forces in the Commission, or the develop-
ment of programmes – for example the French PRCC – common to several trade and
development departments or agencies in the same MS, have been designed precisely to
favour exchange of information and skills to improve complementarity and effective-
ness in the provision of TCB assistance and also to increase the resources allocated to
this type of activity. It will be seen, when discussing Judgement Criterion J.4.1, that the
success of these undertakings varies, but it is important to highlight that there is
awareness of the need as well as of the difficulties, and that the move in this direction
is continuing and deepening.
At HQ level the co-ordination mechanisms reflect the different nature of the mandates
of the Commission in the areas of trade and development. On trade-specific issues, the
133 Committee is a Council mechanism, the design of which is appropriate for the exe-
cution of its formal mandate. It deals with TCB issues only insofar as they are related to
problems that are dealt with in the Trade and Development Committee of the WTO
where the Commission expresses the position of the whole European Union. The
Committee discusses strategic and political aspects of trade and involves the high-level
participation of both the Commission and the Member States. TCB issues remain mar-
ginal in this context (an example is approval of the work programme of the WTO global
trust fund for technical assistance) but their importance is growing. Numerous infor-
mal meetings relating to the work of the 133 Committee take place in Brussels and
Geneva and there is a constant exchange of notes and mails.
On general development issues formal HQ co-ordination takes place in the CODEV and
TCB is very marginal in this context. Internal Commission procedures impose and ver-
ify that co-ordination with the MS and the partners has duly taken place in the prepara-
tion of strategic programming documents such as Country and Regional Strategies
and the related National and Regional Indicative Programmes. Again the scope of
these co-ordination mechanisms is much broader than trade-related issues.
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The Joint Trade and Development Expert Group is the most important co-ordination
mechanism between the MS and the Commission in the field of TCB. It is designed to
increase the convergence between trade and development personnel and institutions
and it is practically the only MS-Commission co-ordination group for TCB at HQ level.
The agenda of the group has so far focused on WTO issues, the Integrated Framework,
the Commission’s trade-related policies, presentation of trade-related policies by the
MS, and discussion of specific TCB issues. It is primarily a forum for mutual informa-
tion and exchange of views and an interesting platform for discussing policy issues,
but so far information and data on activities under preparation in the MS have been
almost non-existent. The group has developed a website, albeit restricted to registered
participants, which is a source of information on a range of topics related to trade and
development.
Participants in this group have been consulted through interviews and questionnaire
surveys on the appropriateness of the organisation and role of the group. On the
functioning of the group there is a general view that the frequency of the meetings is
adequate, that invitations should be addressed by the Commission – which manages
the secretariat of the group – to the appropriate institutions and services, and that the
topics on the agenda are of interest. However, whereas it is generally agreed that ex-
change of information on and adoption of best practice is an important topic, it has not
really been addressed. Similarly, the Commission has attempted to include in the agenda
a discussion on the Guidelines for trade-related assistance which it produced for its
own Services; it hoped to gather the experience and opinion of other MS and possibly to
move towards the adoption of common guidelines, but the MS have been reluctant and
so far the point has not been addressed.
It is worth noting there is a difference of view between Commission and MS partici-
pants on the status of the group. The Commission representatives tend to appreciate
its informal status, which theoretically makes possible “free discussions” since the
speakers do not commit their institutions. In contrast several MS representatives con-
sider that, in the absence of a formal mandate, the views of the Joint Trade and Devel-
opment Expert Groups are not presented to and can be ignored by the 133 Committee.
J.1.2 The persons participating in these mechanisms work within the TCB area in their own
institutions and their feedback to their home institutions is taken into account and,
possibly, acted upon.
Participation tends to be dominated by Commission representatives. Only a few MS
(mainly the UK, Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark) regularly send two people, one from
development and one from trade, and ensure the participation of the same persons in
successive meetings. The involvement of other MS from EU-15 is variable but tends to
be weak, whereas there is evident interest from the new MS for which the group is a
source of information in a field where they have little or no experience. The resulting
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heterogeneity and absence of continuity in participation is a factor that has limited the
“blend” of trade and development staff and limited the possibility of following-up on
points which were the object of agreement or consensus. However participants in the
Group generally provide feedback to their own institutions.
The conclusions of the meetings of the group are not recorded in minutes in view of
its informal status, and although summary notes are provided there is a general
complaint that they are produced and distributed too late.
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Answer to Evaluation Question 1
The Commission and the Member States have increasingly devoted internal
efforts to co-ordinating their own trade and development services.
In the trade area the main co-ordination mechanism is the 133 Committee
designed to allow the Commission to inform the MS on how it fulfils its exclu-
sive mandate in international negotiation fora and to take account of the views
of the MS when preparing the Community position. The work of the Committee
is supplemented by numerous informal meetings in Brussels and Geneva,
and by exchanges of mails and notes through which participants lobby for
their respective views and interests. The design and the operational proce-
dures (formal and informal) of the 133 Committee and its preparatory groups
are appropriate to its objective.
In the development area the MS and the Commission have individual policies
and the main informal co-ordination mechanism, the Joint Trade and Devel-
opment Experts Group, has been created to improve understanding of the
convergence between trade and development and to bring together actors
operating in these two areas, sharing information on the policies and activi-
ties of the MS and the Commission, and strengthening co-ordination through
the adoption of best practices and common guidelines. The Joint Trade and
Development Experts Group is regarded as a useful and necessary mecha-
nism but its functioning suffers from a number of weaknesses:
– apart from Commission staff and a few of the more active MS, heteroge-
neity in participation and absence of continuity have limited the “blend-
ing” of trade and development representatives;
– the group offers a valuable forum for exchanging views and information,
but insufficiently included in its agenda is any systematic provision of
information on the intended future activities of the participants, an essen-
tial point for co-ordination;
– the adoption of best practices is regarded as important by members but
has not really been addressed by the agenda;
– similarly there has been no consensus for discussion of the EC guidelines
for TCB and for a move towards common guidelines;
– the group’s informal status, and in particular the absence of documents
produced by the group, limits follow-up on points agreed at the meetings.
3.2.2 Evaluation Question 2: Appropriate design of co-ordination mechanisms set up at
partner country level
This second Evaluation Question addresses the relevance and the appropriateness of
the co-ordination mechanisms developed in-country between the Commission, the MS
and the partner at country and regional level. The Judgement Criteria try to capture
whether the range of mechanisms developed is appropriate to enable the intended
objectives of this type of co-ordination to be fulfilled.
J.2.1 The mechanisms (co-ordination committees, consultation procedures, working groups,
etc.) are designed to facilitate sharing of information, the adoption of best practices and
development of common approaches in the sphere of TCB.
In-country, TCB co-ordination mechanisms need to be viewed in the wider context of
overall donor co-ordination mechanisms as TCB will almost always be one of the topics
broached in wider co-ordination fora without necessarily benefiting from a dedicated
donor co-ordination effort set up for that specific purpose. If specific TCB co-ordination
exists, it is country-specific, and might take many different forms.
1 Wider level in-country co-ordination
TCB activities benefit from donor co-ordination at the widest level which seeks to go
beyond simple information sharing to the conducting of joint reviews, development of
common approaches and even adoption of common programmes. This widest level
typically includes:
– Discussions between the partner country and the donors around the PRSP process:
the preparation, annual implementation reviews and three-yearly evaluations of the
partner countries’ Poverty Reduction Strategies are led by the partner country and
involve all donors active in-country. In the spirit of the Rome and Paris declarations,
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Evaluation Question 2
To what extent are the consultation mechanisms that have been set up at partner
country or regional level between the European Commission, the Member States,
and the partner appropriate to ensure co-ordination in programming and imple-
mentation of TCB activities?
Key Findings:
– In the field, the structuring of the dialogue on TCB issues among donors
and with the partner is a very ad hoc process.
– Two generic observations: (i) the involvement of the partner depends very
much on key policy and institutional steps it has made in putting interna-
tional trade in its agenda; (ii) formal donor co-ordination of TCB never
limits to an EU-specific dialogue, but pursues involvement of all donors
active in the country.
this process is increasingly becoming the favoured overall co-ordination forum as
all donors try to align their activities on the partner’s strategic priorities. To the
extent that trade is an issue on the PRSP’s agenda, it will benefit from this overall
co-ordination effort.
– Co-ordination of budget aid, where it exists, is more specifically geared towards the
sharing of a common approach to budget aid (common disbursement criteria,
common calendar of reviews and disbursements, common reviews). Here the
Commission might take a leading role and collaborate very closely with those MS
present in-country and active in budget support. Trade-related issues are only
discussed in so far as they are one of the factors influencing macroeconomic and
budgetary performance.
The Donor Assistance Group (DAG), where it exists and plays an active role, is an
important forum for co-ordination amongst donors. All donors present in the country
are invited to participate. Co-ordination in this context aims at common donor ap-
proaches, common views, common best practices and so forth on any issue on which
they provide support to the partner country16. In several countries it has helped donors
develop common views on PRSP and budget support. It might still be far from reaching
consensus on TCB but in other areas (including other sectors such as health or educa-
tion) donors do often manage to speak with one voice. It does not systematically
include the partner country but facilitates discussions with it in the various fora such
as the PRSP or budget support reviews, or in sector or multi-sectoral topical reviews.
2 TCB co-ordination in-country
In addition to these wider co-ordination mechanisms, country-specific TCB co-ordination
mechanisms may exist. The shape of these co-ordination mechanisms is very country
specific and will typically depend on:
i) the importance of trade as a development issue in the partner country’s PRSP:
where trade is identified specifically as one of the priority areas, the government
will try to manage and co-ordinate donor involvement in the area of trade. If there
is no specific trade policy or strategy, the partner will be far less likely to get in-
volved in donor co-ordination and its capacity to take part in this co-ordination
might be weak;
ii) the existence or not of an IF approach. Where the IF exists, there will be a co-
ordination group for the IF in which all donors take part (see below);
iii) the number of donors actively involved in TCB: the lesser the number of donors,
the more informal will be the mechanism. If donors are very few and the sector is
relatively new to donor support, the risks of overlapping or duplication will be
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16 Evaluation Question 5 on implementation and outcomes of the co-ordination mechanisms in the field will
temperate the actual contribution of the DAG to adopting common approaches, common views, com-
mon best practices. In Ethiopia for example, co-ordination through the DAG is rather focused [or limited]
to information sharing.
considered too remote to justify setting up any formal co-ordination mechanisms
(as in Madagascar for example);
iv) the importance of TCB in donors’ aid programmes: again the larger the share of aid
going to TCB, the more important will be the need for formal co-ordination mecha-
nisms.
v) and lastly, the type of donors involved in-country in TCB and their individual atti-
tude towards trade-related issues: many donors retain a preference for a bilateral
approach to TCB.
Depending on the factors just mentioned, the co-ordination mechanisms may typically
take the form of:
– the IF co-ordination group (it should be noted that, that in contrast with other
groups, the frequency of IF meetings is insufficient);
– a co-ordination group for private sector development (PSD), where trade issues are
treated as part of PSD issues (groups exclusively dedicated to trade-related activities
are more often found in non-ACP countries); one such group has been set up in
Ethiopia through the EC’s initiative (formerly uniquely focused on PSD, since 2004
it has encompassed a focus on trade issues);
– ad hoc groups (usually linked to a sector, e.g. the informal “fish” group for capacity
building in the fish export sector in Benin, or to a specific project or programme,
such as the BAMEX in Madagascar involving the US, French and Malagasy authori-
ties, or the DFID Regional Trade Facilitation Programme in Botswana.).
There is usually no specific intra-EU co-ordination of TCB as it is viewed neither as a pri-
ority nor as relevant for responding to a particular need. Where they exist, TCB-specific
co-ordination groups aim at information sharing, conduct of joint programme or policy
reviews, and elaboration of common donor views on the criteria used for support. The
TCB co-ordination groups typically address the following types of question:
– What should be done? This is systematically addressed in the IF through the under-
taking of diagnostic studies; it is also addressed through the WTO accession process.
Where none of these exist, co-ordination groups will address the issue in a more ad
hoc manner, at least trying to avoid duplication or overlap of activities and searching
for complementarity of action to optimise the effectiveness of support.
– Who will do what? Co-ordination mechanisms focus on information sharing rather
than on strategic coverage of needs; indeed donors tend to preserve their own inter-
ests and allocate their resources in line with their own priorities, co-ordination inter-
vening once resource allocation decisions and planning of interventions have already
taken place. Co-ordination at the time of programming seems the exception rather
than the rule.
– How will it be done? Capitalisation on comparative advantage and experience shar-
ing do not seem to be priority topics on the agenda of the large donor co-ordination
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groups. It is more in the technical groups that the question is addressed in the con-
text of limited activities.
J.2.2 The TCB interventions in the partner countries reflect the priorities established in the
mechanisms of co-ordination of the Commission and Member States activities.
The Joint Trade and Development Expert Group (see above EQ1) is the most important
co-ordination mechanism at HQ level between the MS and Commission in the field of
TCB but it remains largely informal. Although it is where Commission and MS policies
on TCB are presented and discussed, there is no formal output on TCB priorities to be
passed down to country-level operators. Hence individual donors’ TCB interventions
in-country reflect priorities set up at their respective HQs rather than priorities estab-
lished through Commission and MS co-ordination at HQ level.
From the questionnaires returned under the survey, it appears that where common
views are developed at HQ level they are reflected in the PSD and IF co-ordination groups.
J.2.3 These mechanisms are designed and operated in such a way as to optimise the role of the
partner.
In the context of wider-level co-ordination mechanisms, the partner almost always
takes the lead on PRSP-related co-ordination17. Where co-ordination specifically con-
cerns TCB, the partner is almost always invited to participate in or chair the co-ordination
groups but is only rarely the instigator of such an initiative. The participation of the
partner in these sector-specific co-ordination efforts will again be very country-specific
and depend upon (i) political aspects and the willingness of the partner to use these
groups, (ii) the partner’s institutional structure and its internal co-ordination mecha-
nisms and (iii) the partner’s dialogue with private sector or trade operators where
donors can be invited as observers or participants.
One of the problems identified in optimizing the role of the partner in this co-
ordination process is that TCB activities are typically falling under different technical
ministries, being a multi-sectoral topic: ministries of finance and economy, of plan-
ning, of commerce and industry and of productive sectors (foremost agriculture and
fisheries) are all interested in TCB issues but none can take a decision that would
involve more than that ministry. The problem becomes one of identifying the right
interlocutors to take part in the co-ordination discussion groups, that is the right mix
of technical expertise required by the co-ordination group with nevertheless a suffi-
ciently high level of responsibility to be able to take meaningful decisions.
The foregoing problem was encountered in Ethiopia where the DAG TCB group was
willing to interact with the government in a more formalized co-ordination group but
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17 From answers to questionnaire A (see annex 9) and from field visits in Ethiopia and Madagascar.
failed to do so owing to the inability of the government to identify the right personnel
to represent it in these discussions. Thematic or cluster groups focusing on specific
TCB issues (SPS, WTO accession, standards and certification) have invited speakers or
interested parties from the government on a case-by-case basis but participation from
the government is neither systematic nor formalised.
In Madagascar, on the other hand, no co-ordination mechanisms have been set up,
donors considering themselves to be too few and with too limited a scope of TCB activi-
ties to warrant any formal co-ordination. The government however has developed a
wide range of consultation mechanisms with the private sector which cover inter alia
trade-related issues. However, trade issues are not the exclusive topic of discussion and
donors are not systematically part of these discussions. The consultations therefore do
not lead to TCB co-ordination even though private sector participants consider that the
needs expressed in these fora receive little attention from the donors.
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Answer to Evaluation Question 2
At country level, the objectives of co-ordination include sharing of informa-
tion, adoption of best practices and development of common approaches.
Where specific TCB co-ordination mechanisms have been set up at country
level, most donors active in the field of TCB in the country have participated
and have tried, not always successfully, to involve the partner in discussions.
Participation of the partner in discussions has also been dependent upon the
existence of a pro-trade policy within the PRSP, the institutional capacity to
participate in discussions and the ability to identify a responsible spokesper-
son for the various parties interested in the issue that cuts across the compe-
tences of different ministries.
The outcomes of the co-ordination efforts have not been measurable but the
mandate of these groups certainly includes information sharing, common
reviews and development of common approaches.
3.2.3 Evaluation Question 3: Achievements of Commission and MS participation in
multilateral initiatives
J.3.1 EU participation is co-ordinated in advance and aims at optimising EU influence at
wider level
Under the WTO, distribution of mandates between EU donors is complex and results in
a complex co-ordination framework:
– The WTO budget is decided at the Committee for Budget and Financial Affairs
(CBFA): there is no EU co-ordination here, each MS acting separately. In the CBFA the
amount of the WTO trust fund is decided, each MS negotiating individually (excluded
from the mandate of the 133 Committee).
– The programme of the WTO trust fund is decided by the WTO Committee on Trade &
Development18 and therefore prepared by the EU in the 133 Committee and in EU
co-ordination meetings in Geneva. These Geneva meetings, which prepare discus-
sions with the WTO Secretariat, are chaired by the Commission Delegation19 and
their mandate is determined by the 133 Committee. But these meetings, rather than
being co-ordination fora, appear to be used by the MS to monitor the issues that the
Commission intends to raise. Here the MS representatives can ask the Commission
Delegation about its activities, but never, at least formally, present their own inter-
ventions. This takes place in the 133 Committee.
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Evaluation Question 3
To what extent did the Commission and MS participation in multilateral initia-
tives or in TCB activities that are organised and/or managed at a wider multilat-
eral level achieve its expected benefits (i.e.: economies of scale, knowledge sharing
in TCB implementation, promotion of EU objectives in wider fora, optimisation of
EU influence in TCB activities, leverage)?
Key Findings:
– At multilateral level, the decisions for which the Commission receives a
mandate from the MS are structured by formalised mechanisms.
– Beside this, MS and the Commission act autonomously in developing
interactions with other actors;
– On the MS side, whether the interlocutor is an EU donor or not does not
impact on engaging into dialogue.
18 The WTO Committee on Trade and Development is the forum for discussion of all multi-sectoral matters
of special interest to developing countries. All Members of the WTO are also Members of the regular
WTO bodies. The membership of the Committee on Trade and Development therefore comprises all
countries which are Members of the WTO.
Source: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/d3ctte_e.htm
19 Geneva EU meetings in preparation of WTO negotiations are chaired by the EC and the EU Presidency.
– The IF activities are followed-up in the WTO Committee for Trade & Development.
An IF Secretariat is in charge of preparing the programme in co-operation with
donors. EU co-ordination meetings are organized in Geneva prior to the meetings
with the IF Secretariat.
In the WTO meetings themselves the Commission speaks in the name of the Union. At
least one MS considers that certain multilateral initiatives (IF, WTO TA) are too much
influenced by the World Bank – but this, of course, implies less that the co-ordination
process has not been successful than that the weight of the EU has not been sufficient
to offset that of the multilateral organisations or the other participating countries. But
whether an EU consensus prevails or not, the decisions of the WTO are reflected in
action in the field, largely through training programmes. Because of the way in which
they have been set up, for example through the UN agencies, World Bank or IMF,
certain activities – for example the Standard Trust Development Facility and JITAP
– exclude the Commission since only the MS are members of UN bodies. In this respect
the WTO is an exception because it has given the Commission the prerogatives of an
individual member as it has a mandate to negotiate on trade issues for all the MS.
The JTDEG functions more as a forum for the discussion of ideas and possible activities
related to the role of trade in development than a means of bringing an EU consensus
to multilateral decision-making. It has helped its participants to develop a common
approach in terms of the content, objectives and management of multilateral activities,
and to a lesser degree, of participation of EU donors in these activities. However this
has apparently not resulted in sufficient exchange of information on EU activities, let
alone a convergence of approach among MS in their participation in multilateral activi-
ties such as the IF and JITAP20, despite the current and potential importance of these
multinational initiatives to many of the ACP LDCs. Moreover it has apparently had little
impact on the in-country activities of EU donors.
The Aid for Trade Initiative led by the WB and the IMF is proposing a major increase in
financial support for the IF and also extension of the IF to cover most LDCs as well as,
possibly, some other developing countries. In Geneva, following discussions with the
WB and the IMF, the UK leads the Aid for Trade Initiative and seeks to co-ordinate
donors, although not specifically EU donors as there are still very few of them. The aim
is to present a practical and agreed proposal by the end of 2006. Among EU donors the
active players in the initiative are the UK, Sweden and Denmark. The Commission has
not played a major part in this initiative though it will be discussed within the JTDEG.
Even if the Commission wishes to support the initiative – and through that the IF
mechanism – the funding decisions will be made by individual MS (and possibly sepa-
rately by the Commission).
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20 It can be noted that the participation of the EU in IF and JITAP at HQ level is generally led by the MS rather
than the Commission.
More broadly there is a fair measure of consensus on the operation of the IF. In
Geneva the active MS are the UK, the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, Germany and
France. The Commission is not actively involved given that it is not a member of the
UN or its bodies (although at country level it is the facilitator in Mauritania and Sene-
gal). Also the Commission has decided to base its Needs Assessment Studies on the IF
when there is one, although adoption of the IF mechanism as the basis for EC and MS
TCB interventions has not been formalised at Headquarters level.
As far as the team was able to determine from its country visits and questionnaires,
co-ordination in the partner countries is largely managed by the multinational organi-
sations, in particular the WB and the UNDP, where multinational interventions – in
particular the IF – are concerned. The co-ordination mechanisms have helped develop
a common approach, to involve the partner in the formulation of that approach, and
to avoid duplication.
There is no preliminary EU donor co-ordination specific to these wider initiatives. In
other areas the EU may play a larger role such as through the PSD/T working group in
Ethiopia, but even there the Commission is chef de file as it, rather than EU representa-
tives working in concert, initiated this particular working group. In these cases co-
ordination is typically based on priorities established by diagnostic studies such as
those associated with the PRSP (or its equivalent) or a “road map” such as for WTO
accession. It is difficult to conclude that “EU influence”, as opposed to a mutual effort
by both EU and non-EU organisations to improve the match of the respective interven-
tions through sharing information, was considered to be a significant concern. Very
often MS participation in these efforts limited to the few MS directly involved in TCB
activities, and even among them there is a disinclination to participate, sometimes
even in information sharing. This limited participation might be due to the pre-existence
of TCB programmes independently articulated and agreed with the partner govern-
ment and inspired by individual HQ views on TCB; also, MS procedures might not allow
rapid switching of priority areas or activities within the aid programme.
In Ethiopia the IF is the most important multilateral initiative. The DTIS is managed
by the WB and co-ordination involves 14 partner institutions. Priority actions have
been identified but donor response in the form of accepting responsibility for activities
in particular areas has to date been poor. The response to the WTO-accession road map
has been more positive, with the Commission-led PSD/T working group co-ordinating
donor support (although the chairmanship of that group by a member of the Com-
mission Delegation does not mean that he can speak for the EU as a whole). In neither
of these sets of activities is there any specific EU co-ordination. In most cases the
Commission, the MS and other donors independently design their own programmes,
including contributions to wider-level initiatives, without having defined EU priorities
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or even discussed their own proposed activities among themselves, even though once
the programmes are already determined they will explain them to each other.
In Madagascar the IF is the principal co-ordination forum for TCB. The WB provides
the facilitator, the UNDP the secretariat, and the USAID and Commission are part of the
monitoring committee. On the government side the Ministry of Industry, Trade and
PSD is the main participant. However the co-ordination effort is limited by the diffi-
cult interactions within the overall framework for co-operation offered by the Poverty
Reduction Strategy (in which trade is not specifically a priority theme) and the IF, and
by the lack of continuity in the role of the “focal point”. The lack of anchorage of TCB
in both terms of institution or focal point and of policy or strategy has meant that
donors have determined their own programmes independently of the IF. The list of
donor activities does not reflect strategic options identified in the DSRP but simply the
activities that the donors were already engaged in. Many donors view the co-ordi-
nation process as dominated by the WB and UN agencies and thus largely ignore it.
Nor is there any effective co-ordination at the higher level between the donors as a
whole and no specific effort of the few EU donors involved in TCB to optimise their
influence in the multilateral process.
J.3.2 TCB interventions in partner countries reflect priorities established at wider level
There are a number of means through which partner priorities are established – through
DTIS studies, WTO accession road maps, road maps for regional integration, and other
studies – but the extent to which these priorities, rather than those of the individual
donors, are respected in practice is variable. Many donor activities are discussed with
the partner, and accepted by the partner as making a positive contribution, although
these activities do not reflect the priorities established through these studies.
In neither Geneva or Brussels was there any apparent impact of co-ordination activities
undertaken at Headquarters level. It was apparent that the in-country donors consid-
ered that priorities had to be established on the spot.
In Madagascar customs procedures and training is an area where interventions are
envisaged at multilateral level and are expected to be supported by various donors
including the IMF, the WB, UNCTAD and the EU. But an initiative by the UK to start dis-
cussions between the partner government and a private sector customs processing
firm was apparently not discussed in advance with other EU donors.
J.3.3 EU participation in these initiatives provided information lessons (from and to others)
The country visits yielded no evidence of experience sharing as a general, or even less
as a formalised, practice. Indeed in Ethiopia and Madagascar there was no evidence of
experience sharing at all, except perhaps by chance through some exchange of infor-
mation in the PSD/T WG in Ethiopia, or in Madagascar through overlapping activities
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such as between USAID and the FAO over seeds supplies and with the French agencies
over ecotourism and gemstones.
J.3.4 EU participation offers opportunities for economies of scale, greater effectiveness, etc.
There are examples where participation in wider initiatives led to some ex ante alloca-
tion of responsibilities among donors – typically both EU and non-EU – though it is not
the general rule. One example is the sharing out of responsibilities under the WTO
road map in Ethiopia where the Commission, along with the WB, the UNDP and USAID,
formed a cluster group under the PSD-T working group. There is no evidence of such a
sharing-out of tasks in Madagascar.
J.3.5 Benefits from wider co-ordination compensate for transaction costs
The transaction costs of TCB co-ordination are generally viewed as worthwhile, both at
Headquarters and in-country levels. At the latter level there are few such fora and they
generally meet, for example the PSD/T working group in Ethiopia, not more than once
a month. The majority of respondents considered that the principal beneficiary of the
co-ordination mechanism was the partner.
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Answer to Evaluation Question 3
The participation of the EU in multilateral initiatives at Headquarters level –
such as the Integrated Framework and JITAP – is generally led by the MS
rather than the Commission. To some extent this participation is co-ordinated
through the 133 Committee and the Joint Trade and Development Experts
Group (JTDEG) meetings in Brussels. In other cases it is co-ordinated by par-
ticipants in multilateral initiatives in Geneva. The 133 Committee is not pri-
marily concerned with TCB although it does achieve a EU consensus on the
position to be taken in a number of specific trade-related activities such as
the training programmes of the WTO, while the Joint Trade and Development
Experts Group has engaged in discussion about the objectives and manage-
ment of TCB activities and to a lesser extent about the participation of EU
donors in these activities. However this has not in general led to a consen-
sual EU position during discussions in the multilateral for a, nor has it had
much impact on EU donor activities on the ground.
On the other hand, most individual partner countries appear to have ade-
quate fora for co ordination of TCB activities at multinational level. These
take the form mainly of meetings on the IF agenda and meetings of working
groups on PSD and Trade (or similar). In the view of most respondents to the
questionnaires, the problem is that sharing of information on TCB activities,
development of a common understanding of these issues and allocation of
tasks according to donor comparative advantage are important issues which,
although discussed in the PSD/T groups, but nonetheless inadequately
addressed in the IF fora. Moreover, there was little indication of any alloca-
tion of responsibilities according to donor comparative advantage in either
Madagascar or Ethiopia.
The IF is seen by many as the best co-ordination process for needs analysis and a
majority of respondents to surveys indicated that the frequency of IF meetings was too
low. On the other hand DFID views the IF process heavy-handed and time-wasting and
is generally reluctant to serve as in-country facilitator. Co-ordination inevitably reduces
flexibility and some MS point to the loss of time spent in working on harmonisation
and alignment. In this respect the Commission has a poor reputation as regards mak-
ing timely changes in programmes when these are clearly appropriate.
3.2.4 Evaluation Question 4: Benefits from use of mechanisms set up at HQ level
J.4.1 The mechanisms (co-ordination committees, consultation procedures, working groups,
etc.) have been used to co-ordinate and develop complementarities in the provision of TCB.
As mentioned under EQ1, the formal structures for co-ordination at HQ level are not
specifically designed to develop complementarities in the provision of TCB, but rather
to reach agreement or consensus on EU strategic decisions. Thus:
– decisions taken in the 133 Committee determine the common EU trade policies pro-
moted in multilateral institutions;
– the CODEV prepares the Council’s preparatory work;
– results of consultations of Regional Working Groups (e.g. ACP Working Group)
should necessarily be taken into account when drafting CSPS and NIPs.
Co-ordination in the specific case of EPA negotiations is a Commission-driven process,
where consultation with MS on TCB aspects focuses on preliminary exchanges of infor-
mation. MS have participated ex ante in Regional Preparatory Task Forces through pre-
paratory informal meetings, bringing in MS representatives from their Headquarters
(also see section 3.1.2 d).
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Evaluation Question 4
Have the EU co-ordination mechanisms set up at headquarter level been success-
fully exploited for preparation, adoption and implementation of complementary
and/or mutually reinforcing TCB strategies and for facilitating co-ordination of
the programming of TCB activities?
Key Findings:
– The use of EU co-ordination mechanisms developed for TCB has been
limited to exchanging information on EU donors’ programmes and activi-
ties for TCB.
– Despite the Commission’s efforts and despite the Council’s COMM, HQ
co-ordination hardly goes beyond this stage.
At the informal stage of co-ordination, the Joint Trade & Development Experts Group
suffers from a fundamental divergence of views between the Commission and MS
participants on its actual role and potential outputs. On the Commission’s side, there is
regret over the lack of involvement of the MS (few MS communicate on their TCB activi-
ties, while others are more passive consumers rather than providers of information),
the heterogeneity of MS participation, and the lack of feedback on the Commission’s
proposal for developing common EU guidelines for TCB. In contrast, MS participants
generally appreciate this heterogeneous participation and the active communication of
the Commission on its activities. Despite the EC’s efforts, this results in co-ordination
limited more to sharing information than to developing complementarities or adopt-
ing common practices (also see J.4.2).
Another divergence in opinion arises between several MS and Commission represen-
tatives on the capacity of the Joint Trade & Development Experts Group to influence
decisions taken in formal instances: the informal status of the Group is perceived on
the Commission side as an advantage, facilitating more in-depth debate without hier-
archical constraints. On the MS side, some argue that even when there is agreement
on developing complementarities in the provision of TCB, the lack of formal written
records limits the capacity of the Group to influence decisions and debates in formal
mechanisms such as the 133 Committee.
J.4.2 The mechanisms (co-ordination committees, consultation procedures, working groups,
etc.) have led to the sharing of information and the adoption of best practices in the sphere
of TCB and permitted/ facilitated the elaboration of mutually reinforcing approaches.
The Council’s conclusion on the 2002 Trade and Development Communication
included a request for common EU guidelines on Trade for Development activities.
Based on the survey of participants in the Joint Trade & Development Experts Group, it
appears that MS show divergent opinions on the proposal for such guidelines and on
the role of the Commission in that context. A majority of MS respondents were reticent
when asked about adopting Commission-designed guidelines for TCB. When asked if
the Group influenced the definition of a common EU approach to multilateral TCB
activities (WTO seminars, JITAP, etc) half of the respondents stated that the Group made
a significant or fairly important contribution to the definition of common EU objectives
for these multilateral TCB activities; that it helped reaching an “EU consensus” on their
content; and that it helped reaching a common EU position for the management of
these activities. But only 39% thought that it influenced participation of EU donors in
these mechanisms, and only 22% considered that it made an important contribution
to defining a common EU position for their funding (28% thought it made no contri-
bution at all).
There has been no specific EU co-ordination on development of common, structured
information bases on the EU’s TCB activities. This was rather developed at multilateral
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level, through the Doha Development Agenda Trade Capacity Building Data Base
(TCBDB)21, established jointly by the WTO and the OECD. It provides quantitative infor-
mation on trade-related technical assistance and capacity building (TRTA/CB) projects
in favour of developing countries or regions, supported by bilateral donors and multi-
lateral or regional agencies. It identifies recipient, funding country or agency, imple-
menting country or agency, and the category of TRTA/CB activities, of 42 bilateral and
multilateral donor agencies. It also identifies donor contributions to TCB Trust Funds
(ITC, JITAP, Integrated Framework Trust Fund, WTO Trust Funds)22.
Two main EU mechanisms exist that improve identification at HQ level of partners’ TCB
needs: the impact assessments of EPAs and Trade Needs Assessments23. But these two
approaches are largely Commission-driven, and MS involvement remains limited to
preliminary consultation and feedback (see above J.4.1).
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Answer to Evaluation Question 4
The Council’s Conclusion on the 2002 Trade and Development Communica-
tion included a request for common EU guidelines on Trade for Development
activities. The Commission tries promoting this approach in the JTDEG. But
this hasn’t materialised to date. Reticence is visible on the MS side on the
adoption of common EU guidelines for TCB. EU co-ordination at this HQ
level is clearly limited to exchanging information on EU donors’ programmes
and activities for TCB.
However, this basic level of co-ordination is not perceived as satisfactory, for
a series of reasons:
– The information flow is essentially a one-way flow, from the Commission
to the MS, with low involvement of most MS.
– There is little information on what is achieved in the field.
– There is no continuous or structured link between HQ-based co-ordination
mechanisms for TCB and corresponding in-country mechanisms.
– Co-ordination in the programming of TCB is not designed around a
specific EU framework, but around multilateral initiatives. Mechanism
such as the IF process, the WTO Trust Funds or the WTO accession plans
facilitate a participative and complementary approach between all partici-
pants. Where TCB co-ordination at multilateral level does not deal with
trade negotiations, EU donors act autonomously and MS are keen on
defending their own priorities.
21 Doha Development Agenda Trade Capacity Building Database (TCBDB): http://tcbdb.wto.org
22 Annex 6 presents information extracted from the TCBDB.
23 The Trade Needs Assessment aims to provide a coherent framework for programming the Commission’s
trade-related interventions. In countries already covered by the IF, the available DTIS is taken as a basis.
The Trade Needs Assessment is carried out region by region, starting with Asia in 2005. The other regions
including ACP should be covered in time for the new programming cycle.
Co-ordination that contributed to or facilitated the elaboration of mutually-reinforcing
approaches for TCB has been observed in the field: in Ethiopia, this happened at IF level
(DFIS) and through the WTO Road Map. But again these two approaches are not limited
to specific EU co-ordination mechanisms; they were instigated and led by multilateral
institutions.
3.2.5 Evaluation Question 5: Benefits from use of mechanisms set up at partner country level
J.5.1 The consultation mechanisms (co-ordination committees, consultation procedures,
working groups, etc.) have been used to co-ordinate and develop complementarities in
the provision of in-country TCB.
There is no general pattern for in country co-ordination of TCB activities. In Ethiopia,
specific co-ordination mechanisms have been put in place to help identification, pro-
gramming and implementation of donor activities primarily in the field of private sec-
tor development and trade. They are the PSD-T/WG and its related specific cluster
groups established under the general Donor Assistance Group. The Commission,
which is also the facilitator for the IF in Ethiopia, has played and is playing a proactive
role in shaping and animating these groups.
These mechanisms have been mainly used to share information on PSD and trade-
related activities between the participants involved in this kind of interventions and
they have undoubtedly improved mutual information exchange. They have enabled the
donors to develop a common view on the broad message they want to convey to the
government with regards to what it should do in the area of PSD and trade. They also
contributed to avoiding duplication of effort but they have not matured into common
programming, harmonisation of procedures, and so on. So far the scope for comple-
mentarity between donors has been very limited. Only in the case of the WTO accession
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Evaluation Question 5
Have the consultation mechanisms set up at partner country or regional level
between the European Commission, the Member States, and the partner been
sufficiently exploited to ensure co-ordination of programming and implementa-
tion of TCB activities?
Key Findings:
– Co-ordination mechanism for TCB in the field have been exploited to facil-
itate complementarities and to limit redundancy of initiatives.
– Donors are linked to priorities established in their respective HQ, and the
partner generally lacks a clear trade policy and capacity susceptible of
leading the co-ordination machinery.
– Overall, co-ordination does not mature into the development of common
programming and to a common strategic response to partner’s needs.
road map has co-ordination led to a comprehensive and strategically planned coverage
of the needs by several donors (Commission, UNCTAD, UNDP, USAID and World Bank).
It is clearly an example of effective harmonisation but it is noteworthy that no EU MSs
took part.
In contrast to the reception of the road map for WTO accession, the IF/DTIS has evoked
little response so far from donors, who have continued individually to pursue what
they regard as the key priorities. Apart from UNIDO and UNDP who agreed to work
together to meet the priority needs identified in the Plan of Action associated with the
DTIS, other donors have so far simply highlighted those needs with which their on-
going programmes were consistent. This state of affairs is likely to change with the
current revision of the SDPRP which makes PSD/T one of its priorities for sustainable
growth, and the PSD/T WG is prepared to co-ordinate activities supporting the Plan of
Action in that context.
In Madagascar, co-ordination between EU donors and with other donors is largely
informal but regular. Co-ordination between donors and with the partner government
is well developed in many areas (Partnership Framework for Budget Support, Envi-
ronment, Education) but none of these focuses on trade-related and TCB issues. In
this field the monitoring committee of the IF constitutes the main framework but in
practice it has stalled since the formal validation of the DTIS. Contacts with the donors
result neither in additional development assistance nor in a convergence of donors to
fill the gaps in the trade integration priority actions matrix.
EU donors are few and they frequently meet informally; they co-operate with each other
and with other donors in a number of sectors (horticulture, fish, support to private sec-
tors), and in those areas their co-ordination has led to some complementarity and
avoidance of duplication. However, this is not the result of a joint strategic approach
organising a joint effort to address priority needs, but rather of the mismatch between
the wide range of needs and the limited resources available to address them.
From the analysis of co-ordination in these two countries and from the questionnaire
survey a number of observations can be formulated on the use made of the co-ordi-
nation mechanisms and of their effectiveness in achieving complementarity in TCB
provision in the partner countries.
The Member States and the Commission do not have necessarily a common view on
the priorities for TCB interventions. Decisions on and selection of intervention by the
donors remain largely in line with their priorities established in their own Headquar-
ters or in the country; these priorities depend other domestic decisions such as the
existence of specific programmes developed at HQ level (for instance the French PRCC or
the centrally managed but locally implemented Trade and Poverty Programme of DFID).
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In the areas of trade and TCB it is widely accepted that the IF and in particular the pri-
ority Action Plan associated with the DTIS offers the best framework for co-ordinating
strategically the provision of assistance. Donors are increasingly aware of this and
specific TCB co-ordination groups are generally focused on using the IF as a refer-
ence. However, so far the response of the donors to the priority action plans has been
very limited, provoking disappointment on the part of the partner. Several factors
contribute to this situation:
– the national trade policy is often insufficiently developed and formulated to offer a
clear reference framework;
– limited management capacity in the government limits the extent to which local
institutions take a pro-active role, even when their mandates allow it.
The co-ordination mechanisms have greatly improved the sharing of information and
permitted avoidance of duplication, but only in a minority of cases have they led to
common implementation schedules, adoption of best practice, or common mecha-
nisms for monitoring and evaluating implementation of TCB.
Finally, in the area of TCB it is not intra-EU co-ordination that matters but co-ordination
of all actors, generally limited in number, involved in this type of activity.
J.5.2 The EU approach, including its internal co-ordination mechanisms and contacts with
other donors, has involved the partner in view of increasing its participation in the overall
co-ordination process covering all donors in this field
The EU donors are always willing and trying to involve the partner and give it an in-
creasing role in the co-ordination process. Situations differ from country to country. In
Ethiopia, the government has not been willing to take a leading position in the main
co-ordination group (PSD/T) where TCB is discussed although this has been proposed.
However, some departments take a very proactive role in developing programmes with
groups of donors (an example is the co-operation between the Department of Export
Promotion of the MoTI, the Trade Facilitation Bureau in Canada and the ITC). Some
individual donors (GTZ) have also established, through years of co-operation and
dialogue, excellent working relations with the authorities but calls to other donors to
participate in this dialogue have not been successful so far.
In Madagascar the dialogue takes place under the PNSP with the Government in the
leading role. In this case donors tend to adopt a more reactive than proactive stance in
co-ordination.
The active participation of the partner in the TCB co-ordination process is more com-
plex than in other areas because of the double problem already identified: trade is a
fragmented responsibility among several ministries and institutions, and trade issues
may be extremely complex and technical.
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Two elements are very important in ensuring that the partner takes a proactive and
constructive role in the co-ordination of TCB activities:
(i) The institutional and managerial capacity of its trade-related line ministries and
services and the relationship between them. Frequently lack of harmonisation and
absence of overall information on what different bodies do generates wastage of
resources or duplication of activities by different departments with a varying level
of quality (for example, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Quality and Standards
Authority of Ethiopia may do the same things without knowing it).
(ii) The focal point of the IF is the key interface between the donor (represented by the
facilitator) and the local administration, the latter generally being a representative
of the Ministry of Trade with a relatively high rank in the administration. However,
neither personal status nor the importance of the ministry are sufficient to give the
partner representative access to full information in other departments and agen-
cies or to trigger reactions by the main policymakers when needed. These difficul-
ties are compounded when the country undertakes a public administration reform
which generally involves a temporary period when the ablest people take advantage
of the incentives offered to civil servants to leave the administration.
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Answer to Evaluation Question 5
This question relates to the effectiveness of the co-ordination process and
seeks to determine whether the in-country co-ordination mechanisms have
produced beneficial outputs in terms of developing co-ordinated approaches
to TCB interventions. Two Judgement Criteria help to answer the question.
The first verifies whether co-ordination mechanisms have been used to co-
ordinate EU in-country assistance, and to what extent, whereas the second
verifies whether they have aimed at improving the role and the participation
of the partner in the co-ordination of TCB activities.
Decisions on and selection of interventions by donors remain primarily in
line with priorities established in their own Headquarters or in the field, but
always in response to demands expressed by the partner.
Co-ordination mechanisms have been developed in partner countries and
have been successfully exploited to avoid duplication of efforts and to
facilitate complementarities. But in the area of TCB they have not matured
into common programming and provision of a common strategic response
addressing comprehensively the priority TCB needs of the partner. Co-
ordination on TCB activities is generally conducted at the level of the donors
participating in the overall co-ordination mechanisms (donor co-ordination
groups and co-ordination in the context of the PRSP budget support, etc.) or
those associated with particular mechanisms. No specific benefits are
expected from intra-EU co-ordination in the field of TCB.
Whereas the EU donors always attempt to involve the partner and give it an
increasing role in the co-ordination process, the lack of clarity of trade policy
and limited management capacity on the partner side severely limit the effec-
tiveness of co-ordination.
3.2.6 Evaluation Question 6: Impact of co-ordination on programming of TCB
This question addresses the impact of co-ordination on the programming of TCB inter-
ventions and seeks to assess whether EU co-ordination leads to a more consistent and
coherent approach in the following areas:
– identification of needs and priorities in terms of TCB; formulation of diagnostics;
– appropriateness of the response proposed (in terms of resources allocated to TCB
activities, selection of activities, and choice of instruments);
– avoidance of duplication of effort, provision of increased coverage;
– specialisation of intervention.
Efforts to make the different departments of the Commission at Delegation level and
the Services of the represented MS agencies aware of TCB issues have not yet born fruit,
most departments or Services remaining focused on their own sectors of interest. As a
result, assessment of TCB needs and priorities remains compartmentalized with no
proper account being taken of the multi-sectoral dimension of trade development.
In-country TCB co-operation between the Commission and MS is not systematic and
depends on local circumstances, projects and programmes. The Commission is seldom
perceived as the relevant level for co-ordination of TCB activities.
The question relied on two Judgement Criteria focusing on:
J.6.1 EU co-ordination has led to development of a common approach to needs and priorities
assessment, and
J.6.2 EU approach (including in-country co-ordination and relations with partner and other
donors) has led to a more appropriate answer to partners TCB needs.
The questions suggested by these Judgement Criteria can be approached at two levels,
namely whether EU co-ordination has successfully led to adoption of a common ap-
proach, first within the Commission and the individual MS and partners, and second
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Evaluation Question 6
Does EU co-ordination lead to a more consistent and coherent framework for the
programming of TCB interventions?
Key Findings:
EU co-ordination in the field has not succeeded in offering a more consistent
and coherent framework for TCB interventions. This is related to (i) the com-
partmentalised approach adopted for TCB in the Commission Delegations
and MS representations, and to (ii) the fact that the Commission is seldom
perceived as the relevant level for co-ordination of TCB activities.
between those actors. In both cases it is necessary to verify that the adoption of a com-
mon approach has led to adequate identification of needs and priorities and to appro-
priate answers thereto.
At the first level, findings point towards a frequent absence of co-ordination or
communication between different services (in particular, between rural development,
agriculture and trade ministries, departments or agencies): whereas efforts towards
this internal co-ordination are made at HQ level (see EQ1), trade continues to be seen
as a separate issue by in-country services. Even in countries such as Ethiopia, where a
specific trade co-ordination group is actively engaged in developing common approaches
and views, there appears to persist a lack of communication with other sector co-
ordination groups and a lack of interconnection between the various sector aspects of
trade. As a result, assessment of needs and priorities remains a compartmentalized
exercise with no proper account being taken of the multi-sector dimension of trade
development.
At the second level, any development of a common approach between the Commis-
sion, MS and other donors remains very much the result of local circumstances or indi-
vidual initiatives: in-country TCB co-operation between the Commission and MS is not
systematic, and in any case the Commission is seldom perceived as the relevant level for
co-ordination of TCB activities even though it may take a leading role in co-ordination
generally, as in Ethiopia. Indeed, the choice of with whom to co-ordinate is dictated by
the type of programme or project financed. From interviews it appears that some MS
are more likely than others to co-ordinate: DFID, France and Germany are the most visi-
ble actors for TCB in the field and are also the most active in co-ordinating with the
Commission on this topic.
Even in countries where specific TCB co-ordination efforts are made, some donors, in-
cluding MS, have been found to conduct identification and programming of important
TCB activities without liaising with the co-ordination mechanisms (see EQ5 above for
the example of GTZ programming in Ethiopia). In other instances, MS priorities might
well diverge from the position adopted and advocated by the Commission, such as in
the fisheries sector where MS might exercise their influence on the negotiation of fish-
eries agreements through bilateral agreements and not as an element of EPAs. When
individual MS redefine their own Trade & Development policy in parallel with the
Commission’s mandate, there is a potential risk of conflict and incoherence.
While perceived as an essential topic for co-ordination in the field, common under-
standing of the partners’ TCB priorities and needs is not always put at the top of the
agenda of co-ordination. From the questionnaires it even appears that understanding
of the partner’s needs is seemingly not systematically addressed by these co-ordination
mechanisms.
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On the Commission side, procedures for assessing the partner’s needs are essentially
developed through preparation of EPAs and through the Trade Assessment Needs.
These approaches are essentially HQ-driven and are not always understood in Delega-
tions. Their link with the IF process is variable from country to country.
Where an IF exists there should be, in principle, effective co-ordinated action for
assessing and addressing the partner’s needs; the quality of the process will heavily de-
pend on the country’s political backing for the process, especially on the government’s
good will in effectively accepting the diagnosis made and the priorities identified. In
the field, the Ethiopian WTO accession roadmap is an example of effective co-ordinated
action for assessing and meeting the partner’s needs, even though the government’s
position on the priorities it wishes to promote remains rather unclear and the donors’
activities remain heavily influenced by their own priorities.
3.2.7 Evaluation Question 7: Impact of co-ordination on implementation of TCB
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Answer to Evaluation Question 6
Evidence suggests that EU co-ordination has not succeeded in offering
a more consistent and coherent framework for TCB interventions. Firstly,
efforts to make the different departments of the Commission at Delegation
level and the Services of the represented MS agencies aware of TCB issues
have not yet born fruit, most departments or Services remaining focused on
their own sectors of interest. As a result, assessment of TCB needs and prior-
ities remains compartmentalized with no proper account being taken of the
cross-cutting dimension of trade development.
Secondly in-country TCB co-operation between the Commission and MS
is not systematic and depends on local circumstances, projects and pro-
grammes. The Commission is seldom perceived as the relevant level for
co-ordination of TCB activities.
Evaluation Question 7
Does EU co-ordination lead to better performing mechanisms for the implemen-
tation of all or some TCB intervention?
Key Findings:
– Limited evidence that potential gains expected from co-ordination on
implementation of TCB have materialized.
– Adoption of common schedules and procedures, best practices have not
been achieved through specific EU co-ordination, and have rarely materi-
alized in the framework of multilateral initiatives.
– Limited impact of co-ordination on complementarity and non-duplication
of TCB interventions.
While co-ordination might improve the performance of TCB activities – through estab-
lishment of clear schedules for the activities of different donors; adoption of common
procedures; application of lessons learned by donors in TCB experience in the country
or elsewhere; and through a division of labour between EU donors that reflects compar-
ative advantages – there is in practice limited evidence that these potential gains from
co-ordination have generally materialised. To the extent that there have been gains it is
mainly from the co-ordination process involving all donors, rather than any specific EU
co-ordination.
Co-ordination has not led to the development of schedules for the implementation of
TCB interventions, whether under the IF or other co-ordination mechanisms. That might
have been expected where the objectives and necessary steps are clear – such as prepa-
rations for WTO accession – but there is no evidence that that has happened. In the rare
instances where common procedures have been adopted, these have only partially
reflected the partner’s procedures. Similarly there is little evidence that co-ordination
in any partner country has led to the pooling of “best practice”. There may have been
cases where co-ordination has led to greater complementarity and avoided duplication,
but this is by no means the general experience.
J.7.1 Co-ordination led to establishment and implementation & monitoring of clear schedule
for TCB
It appears that a schedule for TCB activities agreed by the donors requires a “road map”
or a clear goal with well-defined steps. But even where such a road map exists, such as
the WTO accession road map in Ethiopia, co-ordination has not led to the establish-
ment of a clear schedule of activities, possibly because of:
– the lack of partner government commitment;
– lack of close involvement by the partner in the co-ordination mechanism, perhaps
because of a “donors know best” attitude or simply lack of capacity;
– a sense that it is effectively impossible to develop a schedule of activities because of
the inherent uncertainties about the results of any particular activity.
The result of the absence of such a schedule in Ethiopia – and probably elsewhere – is
the absence of any joint monitoring of donors’ TCB activities.
In practice the IF diagnostic studies could be used to develop a schedule of TCB activi-
ties. The responses to Questionnaire A suggest that this rarely, if ever, happens. The
problems suggested above seem even more difficult in the case of IF co-ordinated
activities, because the goal and the necessary steps required cannot be articulated in
such a straightforward and unarguable manner as that for, for example, joining the
WTO. There are other problems with the IF process such as its unclear relation to the
PRSP – which donors may believe is a better vehicle for defining priorities – or simply
that donors have their own independent assessment of priorities. Both these problems
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were apparent in Madagascar where the IF process might have seemed the obvious
route to clearly defined priorities, allocation of responsibilities among donors, schedul-
ing of those activities and an agreed system for monitoring progress. There are however
problems with regard to the IF process in Madagascar (see 3.1.3 above) and, in any event,
the EU donors have expressed the view that it is the role of the government to initiate
such co-ordination which could lead to such a schedule of activities. The answers to
Questionnaire A did however suggest that there have been cases of adoption of com-
mon financing mechanisms for TCB interventions – co-financing, basket funding, and,
most often, a sector-wide approach – but it was not clear whether, where these mecha-
nisms were adopted, there was any specific scheduling, task-sharing or monitoring of
activities.
J.7.2 Co-ordination has let to adoption of common (or partner) procedures
This does not seem to have been the case with TCB, either in Ethiopia or Madagascar.
The responses to Questionnaire A suggest that, in the rare cases where common proce-
dures have been introduced, these were only partially based on the partner’s procedures.
J.7.3 Co-ordination has facilitated application of lessons learned by donors in TCB experi-
ence; and
J.7.4 Co-ordination has led to the division of labour among EU donors that reflects compara-
tive advantages
There is little evidence from the questionnaires or field trips that co-ordination in any
partner country has focused on lessons learnt or disseminating, let alone exploiting,
“best practices”. Only a minority of respondents suggested that co-ordination resulted
in gains from pooling of experiences although the majority consider that co-ordination
has improved the overall mix of activities. There was no overall consensus as to whether
co-ordination has led to greater complementarity and avoided duplication or whether it
has resulted in activities better reflecting the comparative advantages of the respective
donors.
However whenever there has been improved division of labour it is not specifically
among EU donors. Indeed it seems to be more the practice among UN agencies. In
Madagascar, for example, while there is no a priori division of labour between the few
active EU donors or between donors as a whole, the UNDP focuses on strategy formula-
tion, the UNIDO on promotion of agro-industrial sectors, and so on. In Madagascar,
France and the Commission have over time achieved some complementarity of their
activities through mutual information about each other activities. But generally, to the
extent that there has been some division of labour among EU donors, it is because large
programmes dealing with regulatory frameworks (for instance SPS) have been con-
ducted by the Commission.
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3.2.8 Evaluation Question 8: Impact of co-ordination on donors support to a TCB strategy
owned by the partner
The question concerns the upper layers of the intervention logic and aims to verify
that co-ordination has helped to maximise the benefits of TCB for the partner. Three
Judgement Criteria were used to assess the question, relating respectively to: (i) the
existence of a policy dialogue on trade-related areas, (ii) the partner’s leading role in
policy dialogue and (iii) the emergence of a trade policy owned by the government and
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Answer to Evaluation Question 7
While co-ordination might improve the performance of TCB activities – through
establishment of clear schedules for the activities of different donors; adop-
tion of common procedures; application of lessons learned by donors in TCB
experience in the country or elsewhere; and through a division of labour
between EU donors that reflects comparative advantages – there is in
practice limited evidence that these potential gains from co-ordination have
generally materialised. To the extent that there have been gains it is mainly
from the co-ordination process involving all donors, rather than any specific
EU co-ordination.
Co-ordination has not led to the development of schedules for the implemen-
tation of TCB interventions, whether under the IF or other co-ordination
mechanisms. That might have been expected where the objectives and nec-
essary steps are clear – such as preparations for WTO accession – but there
is no evidence that that has happened. In the rare instances where common
procedures have been adopted, these have only partially reflected the part-
ner’s procedures. Similarly there is little evidence that co-ordination in any
partner country has led to the pooling of “best practice”. There may have
been cases where co-ordination has led to greater complementarity and
avoided duplication, but this is by no means the general experience.
Evaluation Question 8
Does co-ordination contribute to the elaboration of a TCB strategy that is owned
by the partner, addresses its needs and priorities and is shared and supported by
the donors?
Key findings:
– The existence of a clear trade policy direction on the partner side is a pre-
requisite for structuring dialogue on TCB aspects.
– From interviews and field visits, the IF clearly emerges as a co-ordination
process capable of framing the policy dialogue with the partner, contribut-
ing to its ownership of a TCB strategy, addressing its needs and priorities
with donors support.
endorsed by the donor community. The question addresses the fundamental issue
that eventually donor co-ordination, through policy dialogue gradually led by the part-
ner, must converge towards a single coherent set of policies which:
– are ‘owned’ and managed by the partner in the light of its own needs and priorities,
– promote the partner’s interests,
– are shared and supported by the donors, even when their economic interests diverge.
Whether co-ordination has facilitated development of a TCB strategy endorsed by the
government and the donors varies from one country to the other. TCB issues are usu-
ally not a priority in general policy consultations between government and donors and
in many cases trade policies may not be sufficiently well defined to provide a basis for
the elaboration of a TCB strategy.
The IF can help this process along by rallying government and donors around a com-
mon understanding of the constraints and priorities; the IF can be identified as a
co-ordination process that has the capacity to structure and frame the policy dialogue
between donors and partner and has the capacity to contribute to the elaboration of a
TCB strategy that is owned by the partner, addresses its needs and priorities and is
shared and supported by the donors.
Policy dialogue in the field of TCB suffers from unclear trade policy directions and from
the difficulty of identifying within the partner governments a single institution or in-
terlocutor capable of mastering the multi-sectoral dimension of TCB issues. Moreover,
the willingness of the partner government to participate in such dialogue, as well as its
willingness to involve private sector operators, varies.
J.8.1 There exists a policy dialogue on TCB and related areas (which may develop gradually
in terms of number of donors involved and depth of dialogue)
TCB does not appear to be a priority issue in policy discussions even though much
effort was devoted in the 1970s-1990s period to liberalising ACP economies and estab-
lishing adequate conditions for external trade (liberalisation of the trade regimes
under the structural adjustment programmes). The overall policy dialogue which is
focused on the PRSP often does not enter into the technical aspects of TCB, trade devel-
opment often not being identified as a priority issue per se in the PRSP, remaining
more a general intention than an issue to be tackled in the context of a well defined
strategy, work plan and identified actions.
The little attention given to TCB in policy discussion is possibly explained by the lack of
an appropriate forum for these discussions. As seen above (EQ2), the situation varies
from country to country but even where active co-ordination exists (Ethiopia for exam-
ple), the multi-sectoral nature of TCB has made it difficult to identify one single institu-
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tion or interlocutor in the partner government capable of entering this level of discus-
sion (see EQ6 above).
J.8.2 The combined efforts of the Commission and Member States have contributed to the
capacity of the partner to lead the policy dialogue on TCB and related areas
By offering financial and technical support for the implementation of structural
reforms which were part of the structural adjustment programmes during the
1970s-1990s period and which are again an important feature of current PRSPs, the
Commission and MS have been contributing to strengthening partners’ capacities to
lead the policy dialogue, whether in general or specifically on TCB and related areas.
The general support for institutional strengthening has enabled government staff to
be better equipped technically; in many countries this has followed a phase in which
public administration reform considerably weakened the government’s capacity (such
was the case in Madagascar where many experienced staff left the civil service). Particu-
lar efforts in the area of TCB have included the (co-)financing of training programmes to
raise civil servants’ awareness and understanding of trade-related issues.
Whether or not the partner country is able and willing to take the lead in policy discus-
sions again varies from one country to another. The two countries visited (Ethiopia
and Madagascar) give two totally different illustrations. In Ethiopia, the partner was
unwilling and possibly unable to lead policy discussions, owing probably to its unclear
position vis-à-vis its own trade policy and its unwillingness to identify an interlocutor.
The government was thus quite willing to let the donors drive TCB policy discussions.
In Madagascar on the other hand, much effort has been spent on training govern-
ment staff and private sector participants in TCB, and an organised debate exists on
trade-related issues; but donors are not part of this debate and policy discussions with
the government are limited to bilateral discussions. Madagascar seems to illustrate
the case where the partner has indeed potential capacity to lead policy discussions but
has no desire to enlarge the discussions to encompass all donors.
J.8.3 The strengthened policy dialogue has led to the elaboration of a trade-related strategy
which has full partner ownership and is validated by the alignment of donors to it.
As mentioned above (J.8.1) trade is not usually identified as a priority area for govern-
ment action in the PRSP. It has therefore received relatively little attention in the general
consultations between government and donors (whether PRSP or budget aid discus-
sions).
Since TCB concerns different sectors, it also does not lend itself easily to a ‘sector’
approach. In addition, in many cases trade policies may not be sufficiently well defined
to provide a basis for the elaboration of a TCB strategy: in Ethiopia for example, despite
an apparent willingness to strengthen the export sector, foster regional trade and enter
into the MTS, the government gives contradictory signals to private sector enterprises
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which hamper their development and participation in external trade. There persists a
negative attitude a priori towards private enterprises and the development of private
sector activities which does not provide a favourable environment for the development
of pro-trade policies.
In Madagascar trade policy remains unclear, in particular with regard to the choices to
be made regarding regional integration, and not all stakeholders seem to be convinced
by the virtues of international trade. Again, the prospects for developing a pro-external
trade policy are not good and in any case the Malagasy government does not seem to
want to align donors to a single well-defined policy, preferring to hold bilateral discus-
sions and compartmentalising its approach to trade.
This rather bleak picture should not hide the positive changes that can be brought
about by the IF exercise. Where the IF has been successfully launched and is active, it
has offered a platform for policy discussions on TCB and identification of constraints
and priorities, around which government and donors alike have rallied. The Integrated
Framework can thus clearly be identified as a co-ordination process that has the capac-
ity to structure and frame policy dialogue between donors and partners and to contrib-
ute to the elaboration of a TCB strategy that is owned by the partner, addresses its needs
and priorities and is shared and supported by the donors.
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Answer to Evaluation Question 8
Whether co-ordination has facilitated development of a TCB strategy endorsed
by the government and the donors varies from one country to the other. TCB
issues are usually not a priority in general policy consultations between gov-
ernment and donors and in many cases trade policies may not be sufficiently
well defined to provide a basis for the elaboration of a TCB strategy.
The IF can help this process along by rallying government and donors around
a common understanding of the constraints and priorities; the IF can be
identified as a co-ordination process that has the capacity to structure and
frame the policy dialogue between donors and partner and has the capacity
to contribute to the elaboration of a TCB strategy that is owned by the part-
ner, addresses its needs and priorities and is shared and supported by the
donors.
Policy dialogue in the field of TCB suffers from unclear trade policy directions
and from the difficulty of identifying within the partner governments a single
institution or interlocutor capable of mastering the crosscutting dimension
of TCB issues. Moreover, the willingness of the partner government to partic-
ipate in such dialogue, as well as its willingness to involve private sector
operators, varies.
3.2.9 Evaluation Question 9: Impact of co-ordination on the partner entering the MTS
The question addresses a central issue for EU co-ordination. A number of policy mea-
sures are decided unilaterally within the EU or through negotiation with their partners
that affect market access and the trade environment in general. While the coherence
of these policies with development policy is not the subject of this evaluation, the
analysis of co-ordination requires an examination of whether and how EU actors are
co-ordinating their efforts to better inform partners, prepare them to adapt their trade
sector to these changes, and give them the skills to negotiate on these issues.
This question is therefore critically linked to the overall objective of profitable engage-
ment of the partner in the MTS. As many ACP countries conduct most of their interna-
tional trade with the EU, EU co-ordination should address as a priority the consequences
of EU policy decisions and new trading arrangements on their trading position.
Studies and seminars conducted under programmes defined at the wider level (IF,
WTO seminars) do not focus on EU-specific rules and policies. Efforts by EU donors
have mainly taken the form of studies on the impact of the EPA (generally viewed as in-
sufficient in terms of quality and involvement of the partner) and information provided
to operators through various types of PSD project (participants in PSD co-ordination
groups emphasise that the need for information on EU-specific rules and policies,
although important, is insufficiently addressed).
Diverse efforts have been made to develop TCB activities directed to addressing EU policy
measures. They take the form of large Commission regional programmes focusing on
helping countries comply with and adjust to SPS standards, or of bilateral interventions
by one or several donors in the same country. So far these activities remain limited and
do not seem to result from a co-ordinated donor view.
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Evaluation Question 9
To what extent has co-ordination of TCB at HQ level and in-country helped the
partners to cope with EU policy measures that affect their trade environment, and
to negotiate effectively any new agreements?
Key Findings:
– Awareness that EU internal policies and regulations have a major influ-
ence on the trade of ACP countries, but lack of information in the partner
countries/regions on these policies and on their consequences.
– Support to negotiation capacity has been so far mainly conducted through
multilateral institutions and results are limited.
EU bilateral effort in this area is increasing at national and regional level,
particularly in the context of the preparation o f the EPA.
The lack of negotiation capacity in ACP countries is well recognized and addressed by
EU donors, indirectly through their participation to the funding of WTO seminars and
training activities via the Global Trust Fund, and directly through bilateral Commission
and MS negotiation training projects. The impact of the WTO seminars on negotiation
capacities is questioned although their quality is excellent, and EU bilateral effort in
this respect has so far been limited but is being substantially increased in the new
programmes.
J.9.1 The Commission and the MS co-ordinate the provision of information to the partners
about the policy changes and their implications in terms of market access and trade
conditions.
In Ethiopia it appears that there were no discussions or seminars on EU trade policy as
a whole or on particular aspects of it affecting trade with Ethiopia.
In Madagascar, there is great awareness that EU internal policies have a crucial influence
on trade between the island and the EU and are taken into account in the provision of
assistance by the Commission and MS. However, no systematic information is pro-
vided to the partner about policy changes and their implications. The case of the recent
sanitary inspection of fisheries reveals a double lack of communication: inside the
Commission, the intervention was conducted by DG Sanco without co-ordination with
other DGs or with MS; in the country it came as a surprise to the national authorities
who did not anticipate any problems in this area.
Overall, information of the partner on EU policies is not the result of a co-ordinated
effort of the Commission and the MS, but takes place either through individual initia-
tives (for instance the Dutch CBI is an information source on various aspects of EU
regulations on SPS and other measures) or in the broader context of multilateral initia-
tives, like the WTO seminars, which are not specifically targeted on EU policies and
regulations.
J.9.2 The Commission and the MS co-ordinate to identify and implement the TCB measures
that would help the partner countries to mitigate the negative effects or to take advantage
of these changes.
A major effort is made by the Commission to help the ACP countries, through an
all-ACP programme, to conduct studies on the impact of the future EPA. Whilst the
preparation of the EPA is of major importance for the participating countries, partner
countries have in general been dissatisfied with the impact studies. The latter are re-
garded as insufficient in terms of quality and, according to the partners, they are not
co-ordinated with them (although the studies are always made at their request) and are
entirely managed from Brussels in respect of terms of reference, selection of firms and
experts, and validation. What is true is that these studies have been important in rais-
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ing awareness about the stakes involved in the EPA and the complexity and importance
of the efforts needed to meet them.
The implementation of TCB measures helping the partner countries to cope with and
take the best advantage of EU policies and regulations is done through various chan-
nels (see box next page):
– Large Commission regional programmes to help countries on specific themes such
as how to adjust to SPS regulations and meet standards, upgrade the functioning
and regulatory framework of their customs, or access resources to help them cope
with any particular trade-related issue. In the countries visited during this evalua-
tion very few activities, if any, had been implemented through these programmes
and little information was available. The existence of these facilities is usually known
but access to the resources is viewed as complicated; the case of the Trade.com and
Proinvest programmes illustrates the case well as they are regarded as almost in-
accessible to a country like Madagascar in view of the complexity of their procedures.
– Bilateral projects of one or several donors to strengthen capacities in similar areas:
for instance in Madagascar the French co-operation and the Commission are both
intervening with various projects to improve the fisheries sector and the veterinary
services.
Overall these efforts involve some co-ordination, more to avoid duplication than to
define a strategic approach.
J.9.3 The Commission and the MS co-ordinate to identify and implement TCB measures that
help the partners negotiate to their greater advantage new trading arrangements.
There is an acknowledged shortage of appropriate and adequate capacity to negotiate
international trade issues in the partner countries. The EU donors are active in this
field, although relatively less so than other donors (see table 1).
EU donors intervene through two channels: the first is indirect, via their participation
in the WTO Trust Fund which organises seminars and training activities, or via financ-
ing the cost of attendance of the partner representative at a workshop organised by
other institutions. The quality of the trainers, the training material and the selection
of the subjects addressed in these seminars are generally regarded as of very high
standard.
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Co-ordination on SPS matters: The case of fisheries in Madagascar
The Commission intervenes in favour of the fisheries sector in Madagascar at the three levels:
– At field level, the Delegation manages financial support to the Malagasy Surveillance Centre
for Fisheries and to the Malagasy authorities responsible for sanitary control.
– At regional level, Madagascar benefits from the Commission’ regional SPS programme for
Sanitary and Hygiene conditions in fisheries.
– The Food and Veterinary Office (FVO), which is part of the DG SANCO, develops inspection
programmes in the country.
In the field, other donors support the Malagasy fisheries: for instance France provides perma-
nent bilateral technical assistance to the Malagasy authorities responsible for sanitary control.
Source: field visit in Madagascar ( July 2005)
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However, their impact on the negotiation capacities of the beneficiaries is generally
viewed as limited because the selection of participants does not guarantee that the
targeted audience consists in reality of the persons who will be involved in preparation
of and participation in negotiations. The second channel consists of direct interventions
in the form of bilateral projects in support of negotiation training. These remain limited
but new programmes in preparation provide for increased emphasis and resources in
this direction, in particular in the context of the preparation of the negotiations for the EPA.
Overall the main comments received about negotiation training activities is that they
are generally too short and are tailored less to addressing the following two individual
specific needs than to a rather unsatisfactory mixture of the two: (i°) to provide a syn-
thesised and easy to understand introduction to a specific theme directed to informing
officials about the benefits and implications of various international trade regulations
and arrangements; (ii°) to provide, on a sufficiently long-term basis, on the job training
to those who will be effectively in charge of preparing or defending negotiation posi-
tions.
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An inspection report on SPS measures in Malagasy fisheries was released by the FVO during
the second quarter 2005: it led to the interruption of Malagasy export of fish products to
Europe. This sanction characterises a failure in the channel of information/communication
between all actors intervening for the sector (also see scheme above):
A. Lack of communication of the FVO to the RELEX family on its requirements in terms of SPS
standards (identifiable at the level of the Inter-service SPS Group in Brussels, and at the
level of the EC Delegation in Madagascar).
B. Lack of interaction between the EC Regional instances and the EC Delegation in Madagas-
car, resulting in missed complementarity between their respective interventions in favour
of the sector.
C. Due to the two weaknesses identified above, insufficient information from the EC Delega-
tion to the French Representation in Madagascar on the FVO requirements and on the
potential for sanctioning the fisheries sector (indeed, the interruption of Malagasy exports
also affects the effort of the French Representation to build up a competitive sanitary con-
trol authority).
D. Overall, insufficient communication in the field from EU representations (EC Delegation
as a relay of the community instances at HQ and regional levels; French Representation) to
Malagasy authorities on the possible break down of their exports to Europe due to the FVO
inspection.
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Answer to Evaluation Question 9
There is a general awareness that EU internal policies and regulations have a
major influence on the trade of ACP countries. However, there is an absence
of information on these policies and on their consequences. Studies and
seminars conducted under programmes defined at the wider level (IF, WTO
seminars) do not focus on EU-specific rules and policies. Efforts by EU
donors have mainly taken the form of studies on the impact of the EPA (gen-
erally viewed as insufficient in terms of quality and involvement of the part-
ner) and information provided to operators through various types of PSD
project (participants in PSD co-ordination groups emphasise that the need
for information on EU-specific rules and policies, although important, is
insufficiently addressed).
Diverse efforts have been made to develop TCB activities directed to address-
ing EU policy measures. They take the form of large Commission regional
programmes focusing on helping countries comply with and adjust to SPS
standards, or of bilateral interventions by one or several donors in the same
country. So far these activities remain limited and do not seem to result from
a co-ordinated donor view.
The lack of negotiation capacity in ACP countries is well recognized and
addressed by EU donors, indirectly through their participation to the funding
of WTO seminars and training activities via the Global Trust Fund, and
directly through bilateral Commission and MS negotiation training projects.
The impact of the WTO seminars on negotiation capacities is questioned
although their quality is excellent, and EU bilateral effort in this respect has so
far been limited but is being substantially increased in the new programmes.
4. Conclusions
The answers to the evaluation questions in the previous sections are based on the
findings and conclude each specific question. The overall conclusions of the evalua-
tion presented in this section are meant to formulate a synthesis of these answers and
to draw the policy implications for the coordination process.
A. Regarding the relevance and the characteristics of co-ordination among EU
donors (as opposed to overall donor co-ordination) this evaluation observes that
co-ordination mechanisms for TCB are generally satisfactory in terms of their
design, but disappointing in terms of their effects. This is valid for the three levels
of co-ordination considered: i.e. among the agencies and services of the same EU
donor; between the Commission and the MS at headquarters level, and in-country
between the Commission and MS. The main reason for this state of affairs is the
absence of a preliminary consensus on co-ordinating beyond information sharing.
(Conclusions 1 to 4).
B. The systemic characteristics of TCB require that the programming, implementa-
tion, and co-ordination of TCB integrate the multiplicity of actors, sectors and
institutions involved in the process. This is not always the case. (Conclusion 5).
C. The findings suggest that the Integrated Framework, although it suffers from
limitations, is currently the instrument with the highest potential for structuring
an effective co-ordination among all donors involved in TCB. The last conclusion
focuses on this IF process, and on its disappointing results with regard to its poten-
tial. (Conclusion 6)
These conclusions will be spelled out and developed in this chapter, while chapter 5
sets out the recommendations derived from them.
As indicated in the introduction this evaluation relates only to ACP countries, and
therefore its conclusions and recommendations are derived from the analysis con-
ducted in this context. Given the rather generic nature of the coordination processes it
is likely that several conclusions and resulting recommendations apply to a broader
context. For instance, conclusions and recommendations on the improved coordina-
tion for poverty reduction strategies would apply mutatis mutandis to national develop-
ment strategies. Similarly, recommendations formulated with respect to the Joint
Trade and Development Expert Group are of a general nature. However, the extension
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of the conclusions and recommendations beyond the scope of the evaluation, although
suggested in different audiences where the provisional results of this study were
presented, is left to the judgement of the reader. Strictly speaking the scope of the
analysis would not permit the evaluators to make such generalisation.
4.1 The relevance of the co-ordination among EU donors for TCB interventions
The relevance and the importance of co-ordination between EU donors (as opposed to
overall donor co-ordination) differ according to the level: i.e. co-ordination between the
agencies and services of the same EU donor (conclusion 1), co-ordination between the
Commission and the MS at Headquarters level (conclusions 2 and 3), and in-country
co-ordination between the Commission and MS (conclusion 4).
The complementarity and mutually supportive character of trade and development
policies is not new and has been a major feature of all partnership agreements
between the European Community and the ACP countries. It has, however, taken on a
new dimension with the DDA, and the EU donors active in the provision of TCB have all
devoted considerable efforts to improving their internal co-ordination mechanisms
and in particular the level of understanding and communication between trade and
development specialists. Examples in the Commission are the thematic task forces on
trade-related topics, the IQSG for internal co-ordination of CSPs; and co-ordination of
regional programming. The Taskforce on Trade and Development has launched a com-
prehensive training programme implemented since 20041. The Member States have
conducted similar efforts and developed programmes involving co-operation between
their trade and development departments: the French PRCC and the DFID Trade and
Poverty Programme are examples.
This evaluation shows that these efforts remain insufficient:
– It emerged from many interviews that a prejudice remains among the “trade
people” that “development people” do not understand the potential of trade for
growth and development. Reciprocally, several development experts perceive that
trade, although necessary, is not the first priority for addressing poverty reduction.
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Conclusion 1
Internal co-ordination of Services dealing with trade-related issues in the MS
and Commission administrations has been the object of increased efforts
and has improved, but awareness of TCB issues and the capacity to address
their complexity remain limited.
1 The programme is open to DG DEV, RELEX, TRADE and AIDCO and to the Delegations. Training sessions
of ¾ days each have been attended so far by more than 170 Commission staff. The effort is to be pursued
in 2006 with another 120 participants planned and the introduction of distance learning on TCB.
– Evidence persists of insufficient co-ordination on complex issues such as SPS. Even
on the Commission side – despite a Thematic Review on SPS that helps structuring
the dialogue between different DGs – triangular collaboration between the Relex
family, DG Sanco and the Delegations remains imperfect as revealed by the recent
inspection of fisheries.
– Evidence of insufficient co-ordination between the different sector or thematic
sections in the Delegations or the MS representations: trade aspects of interventions
administered by rural development units, for instance, are not known to, or taken
part in by, the Services in charge of trade. This lack of internal intra-agency co-
ordination is moreover mirrored in the co-ordination mechanisms set up between
donors and partners as exemplified in Ethiopia by the absence of co-ordination
between the Working Groups on PSD/T and Rural Development (and between their
respective cluster groups).
– It is also a finding of this evaluation that newly developed procedures and funding
methods can offer opportunities for improved internal and intra-EU (but also
extra-EU) co-ordination of TCB. The adoption by the Commission of Contribution
Agreements to fund regional institutions is such an instrument.
Based on: Section 312b, 312d, J.1.1, J.2.3, J.4.1, J.6.1-J.6.2, J.7.3-7.4.
The co-ordination mechanisms established in Brussels are the 133 Committee and the
Joint Trade and Development Experts Group. The first of these focuses on WTO-related
matters including the various training activities undertaken by or through the WTO.
The second functions as a forum for discussion of ideas and possible activities related
to the role of trade in development. It has contributed to a common approach at Head-
quarters level, or at least to pooling of opinions, in terms of the content, objectives and
management of multilateral activities. But it has not resulted in an allocation of activi-
ties based on the experience of individual MS or the Commission. Nor has there been
any allocation of responsibilities, or even an agreement on appropriate positions as
regards the EU’s participation in multilateral activities such as the IF and JITAP.
Based on Section 3.1.2 a, EQ 1, EQ4, Annex 8, Annex 9.
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Conclusion 2
Co-ordination efforts at HQ level (i.e. in Brussels, in the MS capitals and in
the MS and Commission representations in Geneva) involve formal and
informal mechanisms. They have brought about improved sharing of infor-
mation on activities undertaken, exchanges of ideas and pooling of opinions
and have facilitated introduction of the new MS into TCB issues. But their
results have been limited or negligible in terms of transfer of information on
planned activities, sharing of experience, development of common practices,
distribution of responsibilities or preparation of procedures for EU participa-
tion in multilateral activities.
The formal co-ordination mechanisms at Headquarters level have had little impact
on the in-country activities of EU donors. Any such relationship exists through discus-
sions in Brussels between MS and Commission on how their own activities might
be made more effective, and then transmission to the in-country representatives.
Establishment of guidelines, adoption of common best practices or simply sharing of
experiences, although viewed as important by the participants, are not on the agenda.
Again individual EU donors – at national, Commission and in-country levels – tend to
believe that their programmes are more appropriate, better designed and more effec-
tive than those of other EU donors.
Based on EQ4, Annex 8, Annex 9, Country Report Madagascar.
Any analysis of co-ordination limited to formal mechanisms and their outputs is
bound to lead to misleading and unduly negative conclusions: in practice most active
co-ordination takes place at informal level. Without leading explicitly to common posi-
tions, these numerous discussions, exchanges of views and so forth are important
channels for ideas in which “trend setters” gradually help develop consensus in new
directions and strengthen efforts which are eventually reflected in official positions.
Questionnaire findings point to the fact that participants in the Joint Trade and Develop-
ment Experts Group feed information back to their own institutions but not to the 133
Committee; on the other hand, such information trickles down to the participants in the
many informal groups preparing the formal 133 Committee and official WTO meetings.
It might be the case that the co-ordination objectives identified in the intervention
logic are in fact better achieved through the informal mechanisms, or at least involve
a complex relationship between semi-formal mechanisms that improve the informa-
tion-sharing process (such as the Joint Trade & Development Experts Group), totally
informal mechanisms that prepare decisions, and formal mechanisms where deci-
sions are communicated and explained.
Based on J.1.1, J.1.2, Annex 9.
Whereas there is a wide agreement on the overall emphasis (integration into world trade,
regional integration), views differ on liberalisation (for instance between Netherlands
and Spain on SPS measures in the fisheries sector, between the UK, the Commission
and France on sugar liberalisation, and on the focus of interventions (e.g. growth
versus poverty reduction).
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Conclusion 3
Decisions of most MS on how to address TCB remain primarily in line with
priorities established in their own Headquarters. This results in diverging
views between the Commission and several MS on the way co-ordination for
TCB should be organised at Headquarters level.
Therefore the role of co-ordination at HQ level is viewed differently by the MS and the
Commission:
– Most MS view co-ordination at HQ level more as an occasion to lobby for the adop-
tion of Community policy positions that are as close as possible to their own on
issues like SPS, trade liberalisation etc., and thus more oriented to policy coherence
(although incoherence may also result from differences of view or policy between
the MS).
– The MS active in TCB use the formal and informal co-ordination mechanisms to
exert pressure on the Commission and each other to increase resources provided for
TCB (for instance, lobbying in favour of the Aid for Trade initiative).
– The informal status of the Joint Expert Group on Trade and Development is per-
ceived on the Commission side as an advantage (facilitating more in-depth debate
without hierarchical constraints). However on the MS side, some argue that even
when there is agreement on developing complementarities in the provision of TCB,
the lack of formal written records limits the capacity of the Group to influence
decisions and debates in formal mechanisms such as the 133 Committee.
– All MS, but particularly the new ones, value the transfer of information from the
Commission that takes place through such mechanisms as the Joint Expert Group
on Trade and Development.
– The Commission considers that intra-EU co-ordination mechanisms should (i°)
increase the level of mutual information and (ii°) lead to the adoption of common
approaches. In this regard it is particularly disappointed on two grounds: first, infor-
mation sharing has been asymmetrical (flowing more from the Commission to the
MS than the other way round) and almost non-existent on activities planned and in
preparation; the Commission views this aspect as the most important dimension of
intra-EU co-ordination whereas the MS want to keep a free hand for their own poli-
cies and therefore hesitate to communicate on activities that are not yet entirely
decided upon for fear of losing autonomy; second, whereas the Commission would
like to move towards agreed EU guidelines on the provision of different categories of
TCB, the MS are reluctant and would prefer, if common guidelines are adopted, that
they work at the wider (DAC) level.
Based on J1.1, J.4.1, EQ3, EQ5, J.4.2, J6.1, J6.2, Annex 9.
90 Joint evaluation of co-ordination of trade capacity building in partner countries
Conclusion 4
Most co-ordination takes place at in-country or regional level, both levels
critical because of the necessary involvement of the partner. Specific
co-ordination between the Commission and the MS at those levels is not
necessarily relevant but may significantly influence or even lead all donor and
partner co-ordination.
Individual partner countries generally lack a well articulated view on policy in the areas
of TCB that both government and donors could use as a common framework for inter-
vention and support. There is rarely a common approach or agreement on priorities
except where these have been established through a road map with a clear goal, or
through a diagnostic study identifying the tasks to be done. Generally the Commission
and the MS are keen on maintaining their own priorities. Co-ordination mechanisms
may be established – often trade interventions are linked to private sector development
– but these mainly serve as fora for sharing information on each others’ activities,
usually after those activities have been independently decided. These mechanisms
may result in avoidance of duplication, even the filling of obvious gaps in the required
interventions. But this is the exception rather than the rule. The mission to Ethiopia
suggested that in-country, just as in Brussels, both the MS and the Delegations want to
keep a free hand for their own policies and are reluctant to say what they are planning
before the activities are finalised. Similarly there is no evidence that the in-country
co-ordination mechanisms have led to the development of schedules for the imple-
mentation of TCB interventions, whether under the IF or other co-ordination mecha-
nisms. Nor is there much suggestion that co-ordination in any given partner country
has led to the pooling of “best practice” or a conscious effort to identify the gaps in TCB.
Based on Section 3.4, EQ5, EQ6, Annex 8, Annex 9, Country Report Madagascar
Co-operation amongst donors, even in the countries where an IF is active, has not yet
led to a common approach towards trade-related and TCB policies; each donor, includ-
ing the EC and its MS, have kept to their own priorities and their interventions at best fit
loosely within the DTIS or other framework (if there is one) established in the partner
country. The major objective of attaining a common approach to TCB would be greatly
advanced if the EU could speak with one voice. To this end, co-ordination between the
Commission and the MS is essential so that, at HQ level at least, a coherent policy mes-
sage on TCB can be elaborated and issued to all in-country representatives.
In-country co-ordination restricted to EU level is not a relevant approach. Indeed, con-
sidering the importance of non-EU players in the field of TCB, co-ordination between
these agencies and the EU is essential in all areas, namely identification, programming
and implementation of TCB interventions in-country. Because the EU, in terms of the
MS and also to a large extent the Commission, is rarely among the most important
players in TCB activities in most partner countries, the EU generally does not have the
prominent role in TCB co-ordination in-country. The in-country co-ordination mecha-
nisms typically include, and are often managed by, representatives from international
agencies, often through their participation in the IF, and non-EU donors such as USAID.
This is not surprising given that these agencies are typically involved in TCB while only
the Commission and one or two MS are similarly involved.
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In view of the fact that many trade capacity building issues can be suitably handled in
the context of regional integration, the Commission has channelled most of its TCB
interventions through its all ACP and regional programmes and provided strong tech-
nical support to the regional institutions to enable them to conduct proper identifica-
tion, programming and monitoring of implementation of such activities. Evaluations
of the Commission’s regional cooperation with ACP regions have evidenced the rele-
vance2 and the achievements of such policy3. Apart from the Cross Border Initiative,
which was developed as a multi-donor exercise, these evaluations conclude that donor
coordination at regional level is very limited and that important benefits could result
from its development.
Based on Section 3.4, EQ2, EQ5, EQ6, Annex 8, Annex 9, Country reports: Madagascar and
Ethiopia
Even when a DTIS is available, donors – including the Commission and the MS – often
prefer to rely on their own appraisal of the country’s needs and prepare their pro-
grammes in isolation from other donors’ ongoing or planned programmes. Alignment
on a national TCB strategy would be the ideal solution but for this to happen, donor
co-ordination must first aim to:
– raise the capacity of the partner to identify its needs and formulating its trade policy
and TCB strategy;
– provide a comprehensive (complementarity) response (funds and TA) to these needs;
– provide an efficient response (avoiding duplication, using best practices);
– help the partner to manage and co-ordinate the implementation of the TCB strategy.
Based on J2.2, J6.1 and J6.2.
Overall – both at internal, headquarters or field level – a satisfactory design of co-
ordination mechanisms for TCB is not self-sufficient for ensuring that the process will
provide valuable results. When no preliminary consensus has been reached among
donors (and with the partner) on co-ordinating with the aim of defining best prac-
tices, producing common guidelines, implementing common activities… co-ordination
mechanisms generally limit to a basic level, i.e. information sharing.
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2 Cf. “Evaluation of Trade-Related Assistance by the European Commission in Third Countries”, 24th May
2004. “Evaluation of the Commission’s Regional Strategy for the Caribbean”, April 20005; Evaluation of
the Cross-Border Initiative (CBI) regional economic integration programme in Southern and Eastern
Africa, March 2000
3 For instance, the CE regional support to the development of the WAEMU has been determinant in the
realisation of the Customs Union and the adoption of the Common External Tariff.
4.2 Conclusion regarding the specificity of TCB co-ordination
The findings show that building trade capacity encompasses major dimensions that all
have to be taken into account when designing co-ordination for TCB:
– The policy dimension. TCB covers trade policy and development policy aspects, both
of donors and partners. This creates a risk of indistinct focus and unaligned priori-
ties between the Community trade policy and the individual development policies of
the MS. There is also a risk of conflict of interest between the trade policy recom-
mended by the donor to the partner and the trade policy which is objectively the
most advantageous for the development of the partner. These involve mainly issues
of coherence between different EU policies, which is not the primary object of this
evaluation4. However, it points to a need for strong co-ordination between EU donors
to increase the coherence of their policies. It also emphasises the fact that the
co-ordination required is not just instrumental but at the core of the policy dialogue
between the donors and the partner.
– The systemic dimension. As developed in section 2.2 TCB relies on four main pillars
or building blocks: trade policy, trade-supportive institutional and regulatory frame-
work, capacity to negotiate profitable engagement in the MTS, and development of a
trade-oriented competitive productive base. For trade capacity to be strengthened,
actions need to be implemented simultaneously and in a balanced way in each of
the four areas; indeed each area is an indispensable building block for TCB but none
is sufficient if one of the others is missing. The fact that TCB has to be considered in
the context of this complex system makes its provision a gigantic exercise that prob-
ably no donor or partner alone can handle adequately. The difficulty is compounded
by the extreme complexity of many aspects of TCB: technical complexity of core TCB
categories such as SPS, TBT, dispute settlements, and so on, and complexity of the
links between trade and poverty reduction.
– The institutional dimension. Unlike other sector policies, trade responsibilities
are scattered across a multiplicity of actors in the partner countries and between
donors. Co-ordination within each party and between the parties is therefore essen-
tial but particularly difficult in the case of TCB because many of the actors are either
institutionally weak or not used to handling international assistance, or both. On the
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Conclusion 5
Building the trade capacity of a partner country or region requires a systemic
approach to co-ordination as it addresses a multiplicity of interrelated poli-
cies and activities supporting the goals of the poverty reduction strategy and
its mainstreaming in the national development plan.
4 Another of the six 3Cs studies commissioned by the Group of Head of the EU Evaluation Services is
devoted to the issue of coherence.
partner side in particular, the actors who are technically competent to deal with TCB
are not usually in a position to take policy decisions, initiate co-ordination efforts, or
take responsibility for entering into inter-ministerial discussions (even more if this
should involve donors).
The specificity of TCB requires that such assistance makes sense only if it takes place
within, and is at the core of, a comprehensive development and poverty reduction
strategy of the partner. The response of the donors has been the development of large
programmes integrating as far as possible the several dimensions mentioned above
(as, for example, for a number of Commission programmes supporting regional inte-
gration, for the DFID Trade and Development Programme, for the French PRCC), or of
programmes targeted on more specific interventions (the Commission’s all ACP or
regional programmes on SPS regulations, bilateral support programmes addressing
particular needs). Whereas these programmes have served and continue to serve
important purposes, their lack of focus on the development policies of the partner
countries and the loose co-ordination between them has limited their contribution to
comprehensive capacity building in the partner countries. The Integrated Framework,
revisited in 2001 and currently the object of proposals for further expansion, is so far
recognised by donors as the most practical instrument for channelling and co-
ordinating TCB even if it suffers from acknowledged weaknesses.
Based on: sections 2.1, 2.2, 3.1, J.1.1, J.2.1, J.2.3, J.5.1, J.5.2, Annex 11
4.3 The Integrated Framework as main mechanism for all donor-partner
co-ordination of TCB
The IF has a potential for ensuring an alignment TCB activities between donors and
partners. The validity of the major IF principle, namely that of integrating the trade
dimension and its wealth generating potential into poverty reduction strategies, is
shared by donors and partner countries. In the countries where it is implemented, the
IF is an instrument which undoubtedly contributes to increased knowledge of trade
issues and to a more fluid dialogue on trade between LDCs, donors, and local trade-
related agencies and stakeholders. It helps provide in-country awareness of the com-
plementary reforms needed for trade integration and facilitate a dialogue on trade and
growth across Ministries. The DTIS is always completed with a priority actions matrix
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Conclusion 6
The IF has a high potential for ensuring that donors and partners co-ordinate
their TCB activities. However the IF has not succeeded in concretising this
potential, mainly due to insufficient ownership of the process on the partner’s
side, and to lack of donors’ commitment as a follow-up of the DTIS process.
designed to serve as the reference point for co-ordinating the activities of the partner
and donors.
However, both donors and partners involved in the IF recognise that the process has
not been as successful as expected, maybe because expectations differ according to the
point of view. Donor and partner generally share the view that the strength of the IF lies
in the integration of the wealth generating potential of trade into poverty reduction
strategies. Donors expect that the process will lead the partner to streamline trade into
its domestic poverty reduction strategy and to improve the consistency of its approach
to trade related issues. But ownership of the IF process by the partner government
remains insufficient. This is largely due to a lack of technical capacity to participate in
trade-related discussions, to insufficient priority being allocated to trade issues, and to
a lack of institutional capacity to identify properly and co-ordinate the various Services
and agencies that have trade-related responsibilities. On its side the partner expects
that the IF will lead, once the DTIS is approved, to a flow of additional donor assistance.
A major disappointment arises from the fact that frequently the validation of the priority
actions matrix is not followed by a massive donor response in terms of funding the
identified activities. In such circumstances the DTIS tends to be regarded as the main
output of the IF whereas it should have been a starting point and the trigger for imple-
menting strategic TCB interventions. Several reasons have contributed to this state of
affairs:
– The DTIS is a very heavy exercise. It requires much effort by the partner administra-
tions to participate in it and co-ordinate it. When the DTIS is completed and validated,
it is necessary to do the “marketing” vis-à-vis the multiple domestic institutions and
structures that need to be mobilised to identify and prepare the interventions needed
to implement the priority actions, and finally to mobilise the donors. The very lim-
ited institutional and technical capacity of the partners is a major issue here. The
co-ordinator is usually a relatively high-ranking civil servant of the Ministry of Trade
who, however, seldom has direct access to the decision-makers while the Ministry of
Trade itself is generally not a powerful player in the domestic political debate. These
factors, together with the fragmentation of trade responsibilities and a widespread
lack of understanding of trade issues, combine to limit the proactive role of the part-
ner in driving forward the IF. If the donor’s response is not spontaneous there is
limited chance that the partner will be able to voice its needs properly.
The IF central Secretariat in Geneva has extremely limited resources that do not
permit it to have sufficient information of what happens at country level and even
less to effectively monitor the design and implementation of the integrated frame-
works at field level.
– In theory, the DTIS and priority actions matrix should lead to substantial bilateral
assistance. To avoid a possible vacuum between the validation of the matrix and the
effective start of implementation of donor supported interventions, Window II of the
IF has been designed as a bridging fund limited to $1 million per partner country. In
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practice, Window II proved the main source of funding for the priority actions, but
its resources are too limited for that purpose, and it was found difficult to use on
account of its procedures.
– A major issue is that in effect the DTIS and Priority Action Matrix are not used as
strategic instruments by the donors to identify and co-ordinate their TCB activities. This
results from a double problem of synchronisation. (i) First, when the DTIS/matrix is
validated the donors already have their own programmes and projects prepared and
engaged. Many of these interventions can be connected in one way or another to the
priorities of the DTIS, and donors do highlight these potential links, but this is not
equivalent to strategic implementation of the matrix. Further, in most cases the DTIS
dates back from three or four years. It is not regularly updated, and doesn’t neces-
sary corresponds to the current trade situation of the partner, nor represents valu-
able reference to which donors can embed their TCB initiatives. (ii) Second and
more important, synchronisation between the IF and the PRSP is extremely difficult.
Generally the PRSP precedes the IF. Its monitoring is the focal point of donor-partner
co-ordination, but since it generally does not include, or only includes to a very
limited extent, trade-related indicators corresponding to those of the IF, the trade
dimension is left largely outside the whole co-ordination process. Similarly, donors
are increasingly supporting the PRSP with budget aid disbursed it on the basis of the
evolution of indicators of results focused on macro-economic and social sector
performances but seldom, if ever, on trade.
There is awareness of these problems in Geneva (IF Secretariat) and among the multi-
lateral institutions. The Aid for Trade Initiative5 suggested by the IMF and the World
Bank could provide an answer to the first two problems mentioned, both by strength-
ening and IF Secretariat in Geneva and by increasing substantially the funds available
to implement the activities identified in the DTIS and priority action matrix. The third
one, integration of the IF into the PRSP, requires major co-ordination of all parties
Finally, it is important to point to some features of the IF institutional setting that
limit its potential use: (i°) it is accessible exclusively to the least developed countries,
and (ii°) it applies only to countries, not to regions whereas many trade issues and
substantial trade related capacity building interventions of large donors, notably the
EU, are regional.
Based on J.5.1, J.7.1, EQ 8, Annex 8, Annex 9, Annex 11, Country Reports Ethiopia &
Madagascar.
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5. Recommendations
In view of the conclusions of section 4 the evaluators consider that three groups of
general recommendations emerge. They are in declining order of importance (from 1,
most important, to 3, less important):
1. Recommendations aiming at improving the integration of TCB into the poverty
reduction strategies; they are broken down into subgroups according to whether
they address mainly the headquarter or the field level.
2. Recommendations aiming at strengthening the IF and generalising its use as the
major coordination tool for TCB.
3. Recommendations aiming at improving the functioning of the JTDEG and its role
as major coordination instrument for TCB at HQ level.
Achieving these priorities requires interventions of different actors. Therefore, opera-
tional recommendations are formulated to move towards the goals of the general
recommendations. Each of them is linked to the supporting conclusions and identifies
implementation responsibilities (IR). Three IR are identified:
– IR 1: actions that the Commission or each MS can take individually and could or
should therefore be undertaken immediately.
– IR 2: actions that involve a joint effort by the Commission and the MS and therefore
require prior discussion and agreement. Complete implementation of these recom-
mendations can only take place in the medium term.
– IR 3: actions that can be achieved only through a combined effort of the EU donors
and other donors and partners and therefore will require a longer period for full
implementation.
5.1 Priority 1 recommendations: improve the integration of TCB into poverty
reduction strategies
The general recommendation is that “TCB should be systematically integrated into the
partner’s poverty reduction strategy and should be treated as a priority multi-sectoral issue in
any policy discussions on economic growth and poverty reduction and in any strategies that
are elaborated on the basis of these discussions”.
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As has been argued in previous chapters and highlighted in conclusion 5 as one of the
specific challenges of TCB co-ordination, TCB is a complex matter: it is potentially sub-
ject to conflicting policy interests, it requires simultaneous efforts in four interrelated
and technically complex, and it spans sectors and institutional responsibilities. To face
these three challenges for co-ordination, the widest forum or platform for discussion
and co-ordination would be the most appropriate: ideally TCB should be a one of the
principal components of the partner’s country strategy for poverty reduction. In most
ACPs, the PRSP has for some years now become the one and only policy or strategy
document and is the platform for discussing economic development policies and
strategies. TCB should rightly be at the heart of these discussions, on the same level as
the other major multi-sectoral development issues such as the management of public
finances, good governance issues or the development of the private sector. Integration
of TCB into the PRSP or the national strategic planning documents would ensure that
the various and complex aspects of trade issues are taken account of at all levels and by
all sectors.
5.1.1 Headquarter level
Four operational recommendations, addressed to the headquarter level, are formulated
with a view to moving in this direction.
R5.1.1 The Commission and the MS need to spearhead efforts to increase awareness of TCB as
a multi-sectoral issue in their own development and trade agencies.
(Based on conclusions 1, 5)
The acceptance of TCB as a multi-sectoral issue of primary importance in all policy and
strategy debate is almost a pre-requisite for the success of the previous recommenda-
tions and indispensable for achieving the objective of TCB becoming a principal com-
ponent of PRSPs. As a first step in achieving this objective, the Commission and the MS
will need to promote this idea in their own departments and agencies, consolidating
and expanding the efforts already underway in many agencies as noted in conclusion 1.
At a practical level, co-ordination at intra-agency level is paramount (see R5.4.3 below);
it can usefully be accompanied by efforts at promoting culture change through semi-
nars and training programmes organised for the sole purpose of highlighting the ‘new’
trans-sector approach to TCB that is being developed.
The training programmes and seminars would benefit from joint inputs by the
Commission and MS and could be addressed or delivered to Commission and MS offi-
cials both at HQ and in-country (as is currently the case in some training programmes
on budget support).
R5.1.1 – IR 1.
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R5.1.2 The Commission and the MS should systematically integrate TCB into their institu-
tion’s guidelines whether for programming, monitoring or evaluation.
(Based on conclusion 5)
An analysis of trade issues should be an integral part of any programming document,
whether the regional assistance strategy, country assistance strategy or specific financ-
ing documents. In all cases the guidelines for elaboration of such documents should
include references to and analysis of the IF (if there is one in that country) and analyse
the impact of the proposed strategy on the trading position of the country. In the case
of project or programme documents, the analysis of trade issues should focus on the
impact of the proposed operations (in any sector) on the external trade position of
the country, and vice versa investigate the implications of existing or proposed trade
programmes on the proposed intervention. Whereas this integration of the trade
dimension is important for all proposed interventions, it is absolutely crucial in any
programmes of general budget support or private sector development (including inter-
ventions in productive sectors such as agriculture not necessarily focused on private
sector support): the existing guidelines for this type of intervention should thus be -
revised as a matter of priority.
R5.1.2 - IR 1.
R5.1.3 Pursue the existing efforts already undertaken to address complex trade and develop-
ment issues and disseminate the results of their work and conclusions more widely,
including to other EU donors.
(Based on conclusions 1 and 5)
This recommendation is supported by conclusion 1 and relates to the co-ordination
internal to each EU donor between its own agencies and services.
Within the Commission and the MS administrations considerable efforts have increas-
ingly been devoted to production of internal material to explain the main issues related
to the programming and implementation of particular TCB categories and of trade-
related assistance in general; evaluation of TCB interventions; and organisation of
internal seminars and training sessions. The thematic studies undertaken by different
internal TCB task forces within the Commission, the internal training programme
managed by the Taskforce on Trade and Development, the discussion on evaluations
conducted by the MS1, the current development by the Commission of a database of
evaluations conducted by the EU members, and other initiatives are commendable and
should be pursued and intensified. They constitute a major step to improve the under-
standing of the contribution of TCB to poverty reduction. The Joint Trade and Develop-
ment Expert Group and its website are an interesting platform being developed to
allow for the sharing and exchange of such information (See priority 3 recommenda-
tions) The Group should systematically ask its members to diffuse their documents
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and information resources through this channel, which should be accessible by the
general public.
R5.1.3 – IR 1.
R5.1.4 Increase co-ordination in the preparation of programming, monitoring or evaluation
guidelines
(Based on conclusion 5)
In order to achieve the common goal of raising awareness of TCB as a multi-sectoral
issue, it is desirable that the Commission and MS co-ordinate their approach to estab-
lishing guidelines for programming, monitoring and evaluating their programmes
and projects with possibly the ultimate goal of sharing common guidelines for draw-
ing up programming documents and preparing monitoring and evaluation reports.
This effort would be the logical continuation of the elaboration of the EU Guidelines
as proposed under R5.3.4 but could go further and take the prescriptive form of a
Strategy for implementing TCB enshrined in a Communication of the Commission to
the Council, which would be prepared jointly by the appropriate personnel of the
trade and development departments of both the Commission and MS agencies.
R5.1.4 – IR 2.
R5.1.5 The Commission and the MS should increase their lobbying for the integration of
TCB in the PRSP.
(Based on conclusion 5)
This could be achieved by influencing the Bretton Woods Institutions, in which MS
are board members, since the BWI lay down the requirements for PRSP preparation.
Systematic addressing of TCB issues in the PRSP could become a requirement for
PRSPs approval by the BWI.
At a second level, the same issue should be raised in partner countries, lobbying the
partner’s department in charge of PRSP co-ordination to encourage integration of TCB
issues in the preparation, monitoring and evaluation of the PRSP.
The reaching of this objective will require time as generalisation of the idea that TCB is
a multi-sectoral topic of primary importance in global poverty reduction and growth
policy discussions will depend on culture changes requiring sustained effort in the me-
dium term (see section 5.2).
R5.1.5 – IR 3.
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5.1.2 Field level
Conclusion 4 relates to in-country and regional co-ordination and points to a general
recommendation “In each partner country where TCB interventions are undertaken, ensure
that TCB issues are co-ordinated at the widest level (all donors and government) and that they
are at the core of the donor-partner policy dialogue”.
The extension of the donor-partner policy dialogue to encompass TCB issues is essen-
tial so that TCB becomes a major issue routinely addressed within the PRSP frame-
work. Therefore, the importance of TCB as a stand-alone issue needing specific and
co-ordinated attention should not be lost from sight. In this regard the complexity of
TCB issues implies that specific co-ordination mechanisms should be set up and oper-
ated at the various levels required to cater for (a) meaningful policy dialogue on TCB
issues and their interaction with global policy matters, (b) a co-ordinated approach to
TCB issues, ideally around the DTIS or road map, and (c) practical co-ordination on
technical TCB issues.
R5.1.6 The Commission and MS should ensure that a co-ordination forum for TCB exists
in-country and in the regions where significant TCB takes place.
(Based on conclusions 3, 4 and 5)
If any TCB interventions are undertaken or envisaged by the EU, the EU should ascer-
tain whether or not a TCB co-ordination mechanism exists in-country, if not, the EU
should initiate its setting-up. Ideally the mechanism should involve all donors (not just
EU) and the government and should either cover the three levels of policy discussion,
strategy implementation and programming of interventions, and technical issues; or
else three co-ordination fora should be initiated to fit local circumstances and particularly
institutional responsibilities. For the practicalities of setting up these co-ordination
mechanisms, Ethiopia offers an example (see the Ethiopia Country Report).
At regional level, where the Commission is often the main player, similar mechanisms
should be developed around the regional institutions in order to coordinate regional
TCB and its articulation with the coordination mechanisms set up in the member states
of the region.
R5.1.6 – IR 1.
R5.1.7 The Commission and MS should ensure that co-ordination mechanisms produce
value added to the partner, other donors and themselves.
(Based on conclusions 4 and 5)
Whether or not the EU has played an instrumental role in setting up or even running
the TCB co-ordination mechanism, it should ensure that its benefits go beyond the
simple sharing of information on each others’ current activities, avoidance of duplica-
tion, and filling of gaps, and represent a real attempt at developing schedules for
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implementing TCB interventions which respond to a commonly-accepted prioritisation
of needs, and at the same time ensure that co-ordination leads to the pooling of “best
practice”.
Of course there are costs associated with such a high level of co-ordination. Clearly
there must be more meetings and that may create difficulties for partner country repre-
sentatives. But it is important that co-ordination procedures do not imply a heavy-
handed vetting procedure for determining whether the activities of donor agencies fit
into the overall TCB co-ordination framework. If that were the case, useful interven-
tions – and possibly even donors – might be lost, an eventuality which should be
avoided since the particular skills of certain donors including their working experience
with certain ministries in the partner government – which others might not possess –
could lead to new insights on possible interventions that would be particularly useful
in a given country. Co-ordination mechanisms do not necessarily lead to an optimal
policy mix or the best exploitation of available resources. For example, if a donor has
extensive expertise and experience in the reform of customs procedures, it might be
valuable to use that experience even if the existing TCB intervention priorities would
not otherwise justify it.
R5.1.7 – IR 1 and 2.
R5.1.8 The Commission should propose setting up financial instruments for TCB Pro-
grammes such as contribution agreements open to MS and other donor participation.
(Based on conclusion 4 and 5)
Further underlining the need for a co-ordinated approach to TCB between the various
donors and the government, and beyond the ‘common’ financing available under
Windows I and II of the IF, an additional step towards greater co-ordination could be
made by adopting a common financing instrument for TCB interventions. For in-
stance, the Contribution Agreements are now increasingly used by the Commission
for funding regional organisations in a flexible manner (See section 3.1.2.b). They
could be used more fully to open up to MS and possibly even other donors some form
of basket funding managed by a government agency. It could also be achieved by
increasing the budget support envelope of the Commission and MS and a concomitant
introduction of TCB-related indicators into the variable tranches of the Commission’s
and MSs’ budget support. If the Commission piloted this approach in countries where
there already exists either basket funding of the budget or common frameworks for
budget support, the result could also contribute to achieving the goal of spreading
awareness of TCB as a multi-sectoral issue amongst MS and other agencies. It would
also help streamlining of trade-related issues into the common policy dialogue be-
tween the donors and partner around the Poverty Reduction Strategy.
R5.1.8 – IR 3.
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5.2 Priority 2 recommendations: Strengthen and generalise the IF and use it as
a central coordination tool for TCB
The strong implication of conclusions 5 and 6 is that the Integrated Framework is
conceptually the best instrument to address the complexity of TCB and to coordinate
it. However, it suffers from several weaknesses that undermine its effectiveness.
Therefore the general recommendation is that “the Integrated Framework should be
strengthened, more widely spread and, where it exists, be adhered to”.
To move in this direction three practical recommendations are formulated.
R5.2.1 At Headquarters level and in-country the MS and the Commission should individu-
ally and jointly make efforts to strengthen and improve the IF process and to increase
its resources.
(Based on conclusion 6)
As demonstrated in annex 11, the country notes, the answers to Evaluation Question 3
and conclusion 6, the IF, albeit regarded as the major instrument for identifying TCB
needs and organising the response to these needs, suffers from a number of deficien-
cies that have led to substantial disappointment, particularly because DTIS have in
general not been followed by a concerted response by donors to fund the priorities
identified. The major causes of these difficulties are: (i°) Window II of the IF, which
should be a bridging fund to start activities while the donors adapt their programmes
to cover the needs identified by the DTIS, proved in practice the main funding source
and is insufficient; (ii°) the donors’ reluctance to abandon their own individual
approaches and the difficulty they have in modifying their existing support program-
mes; (iii°) the problem of synchronising the IF and the PRSP, resulting in the absence
of indicators from the DTIS and priority action matrix in the battery of PRSP indicators,
making it difficult for the donors and the partner to pursue and support PRSP and IF
activities simultaneously and consistently.
Efforts of the EU donors (and, of course others), individually and together, are there-
fore needed:
At HQ level:
– Mobilising co-ordination of EU donors to promote the IF and in particular to support
the Aid for Trade Initiative and strengthening of the IF secretariat. The latter point
as been highlighted in conclusion 1 and should be regarded as a pre-condition for
additional funding because the limited capacity of the central Secretariat in Geneva
limits its functioning and does not permit adequate monitoring of the IF under
implementation.
– Increasing resources pledged to the IF enhanced Fund.
Recommendations 103
In country:
– To promote and accelerate convergence of the IF and PRSP processes. The case of
Ethiopia can be regarded as a good example. The Commission, which is the IF facili-
tator, is also working actively to develop the Private Sector and Trade Development
Working Group, and in particular to prepare for the revision of the PRSP and ensure
both that the results of the DTIS can be translated into PRSP monitoring indicators
and also that a roadmap to achieve the common objectives of the revised PRSP and IF
can be drawn up and on which donors can articulate their support.
– To increase resources allocated to activities identified in the priority action matrices.
The needs for TCB are extremely important and the resources of the IF insufficient,
in particular under the current Window 2. It is therefore recommended that EU
donor programmes devote more funds to TCB activities, in particular those identi-
fied in IF priority action matrices. At the same time the possibilities for redirecting
the funding programmed for TCB activities towards the priority needs of the DTIS
matrix and roadmap should be investigated wherever possible.
– In-country, the Commission and MS should as far as possible involve themselves in
the IF co-ordination process and, where together they have a critical mass of TCB
operations, attempt to designate one EU donor as the IF facilitator. Currently, as evi-
denced from annex 11, the involvement of the EU donors in the facilitation of the IF
seems low in view of the relative importance of their contribution to the IF process.
R5.2.1 – IR 1 and 2.
R5.2.2 In country, use DTIS study to organise TCB assistance
(Based on conclusion 6)
As a logical and operational complement to R5.1.1 that aims at treating TCB as a multi-
sectoral issue which is always taken into account, the DTIS and the derived priority
actions matrix should be the framework within which TCB interventions are articu-
lated. For this to happen a number of practical points can be recommended:
– If individual diagnostic or needs assessment studies are planned by a MS or the
Commission they should always start with a survey of the existing material, and if
there is a DTIS then use that as a starting point. The Commission has already
engaged into commendable efforts, which should be generalised, to increase aware-
ness of its staff on the IF and use the diagnostics already prepared by the IF as a basis
of its own Trade Needs Assessments.
– The Commission and the MS in developing their procedures should insist that two
kinds of programming documents always refer to the DTIS if there is one: (i°) coun-
try and regional intervention strategies, so that TCB can be correctly situated within a
wider developmental context and addressed; (ii°) programming documents for pro-
jects and programmes related to any category of TCB should refer to the DTIS to
ensure that they meet priority needs and propose interventions in line with and
co-ordinated with those of the priority action matrix.
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– EU donors should work in-country to develop roadmaps along which the partner
and all donors can organise and co-ordinate their activities. This point is comple-
mentary to recommendation 5.2.1.
R5.2.2 – IR 1 and 2.
R5.2.3 In order to strengthen ownership of the IF by the partner the EU donors should use the
co-ordination process to better assess and build up the capacity of the partner to partic-
ipate in trade-related discussions and co-ordinate its own activities in this field.
(Based on conclusion 6)
The weak technical capacity of partner countries in trade-related matters and in co-
ordinating their own activities is a major stumbling block. Co-ordination of EU donors
cannot alone solve the problem but may contribute to improving the situation by
adopting certain courses of action:
– EU donors should agree that in countries where they have significant TCB one of
them should conduct a Trade Institutional Assessment, on the model of the one
developed under the DFID Trade and Poverty programme, and share its results with
the Government and other donors.
– When conducting simultaneously public administration reform and an ambitious
programme like the IF, the EU donors should co-ordinate among themselves and
with other donors and the partner to ensure that the transitory reduction of capacity
resulting from the reform of the administration does not excessively affect the IF
process and that appropriate mitigating measures are adopted.
R5.2.3 – IR 2 and 3.
5.3 Priority 3 recommendations: Improve the functioning of the JTDEG and its
role as central coordination tool for TCB
Conclusions 2 and 3 point to a deficit of coordination among EU donors who tend to
align on their own priorities and have their own view on how to coordinate TCB. Con-
sidering that at HQ level the JTDEG is the main potential coordination instrument for
TCB, a general recommendation is to improve its functioning and develop its role. In
particular, it should contribute to increase the value added of EC-MS co-ordination in
order to:
(i) achieve a better allocation of resources on the basis of experience,
(ii) exert greater influence on multilateral activities,
(iii) increase resources directed to TCB”.
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R5.3.1 Develop the role of the Joint Trade and Development Experts Group so that it becomes
the focal point for EU information sharing and co-ordination on multilateral initia-
tives on the interface between trade and development.
(Based on conclusions 2 and 3)
It would be of great value if there were a single focal point first for the discussion and
co-ordination of EU experiences, positions and policies on making trade an engine of
growth and poverty reduction. All members should use this working group to explain
their strategies, while taking on board the other countries’ experiences. . For example,
this might entail successive meetings devoted to discussion of activities in a particular
subset of, say, five or six countries. At present there is no formal mechanism for trans-
mission of the discussions or conclusions of Working Group meetings, and diffusion
of outcomes and transfer of information to the MS or throughout the relevant director-
ates is haphazard rather than systematised. Short reports of the activities of the Com-
mission and MS in each country should be prepared for circulation among working
group members in advance of meetings, and minutes should be taken and circulated
to all members the working groups, to the 133 Committee and, in certain cases, to
other Commission directorates (e.g. agriculture or health); this material should be
posted on the Group website. In this way there can be valuable sharing of experience
and development of common practices and, in time, allocation of responsibilities to EU
aid agencies in particular countries on the basis of their experience and expertise.
Note that this recommendation is closely linked with R5.4.3 and R5.1.3.
R5.3.1 – IR 1.
R5.3.2 Draw on the expertise of the Joint Trade and Development Experts Group in the
preparation of the EU position in multilateral meetings of the Integrated Framework,
JITAP, EPA negotiations and other fora and ad hoc bodies which operate at the inter-
face between trade and development.
(Based on conclusions 2 and 3)
There needs to be a formalised procedure – and assignment of responsibilities among
the Commission and MS – for the preparation of a EU approach, wherever appropriate,
to discussions in the IF, JITAP, EPA and DAC fora and any ad hoc multilateral or EU
groups working on trade and development issues. To the extent that the 133 Commit-
tee participates in such meetings the working group should work closely with that
committee and agree on its approach in WTO issues – for example the WTO training
programmes for trade negotiators.
R5.3.2 – IR 1.
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R5.3.3 The Joint Trade and Development Experts Group should be systematically used to
share information and experience on the IF.
(Based on conclusions 2 and 3)
Information on the mechanisms and operations of the IF, and on the main IF topics
discussed in the Geneva institutions, should be provided on a regular basis to the T&D
Expert group by the EU members participating in the IF Working and Steering Groups.
Such information would serve to raise the level of awareness of the members of the
group, and in particular those from the new accessing countries, about the activities
and functioning of the IF.
The Joint Trade and Development Experts Group should be entrusted with the formal
duty of collecting and disseminating information about EU participation in the IF. This
would cover:
– information on the current financial contribution of the EU members to the IF Fund
and on the intentions of EU members regarding their future contribution to this
Fund.
– information by the EU members about their participation in IF activities in the field.
The restricted website of the Group could be used for that purpose.
The Group should regularly invite Commission or MS staff involved in IF country
operations to report to the group on their experience and the lessons to be drawn.
R5.3.3 – IR 1 and 2.
R5.3.4 Make progress towards the production of common technical guidelines on TCB and
other forms of TCB.
(Based on conclusions 2 and 3)
The Commission has produced Guidelines giving practical advice on the implementa-
tion of TCB activities2. So far there has been little response from the MS to the Commis-
sion proposal to discuss these Guidelines in the Joint Trade and Development Experts
Group. This evaluation recommends that such discussion should take place, along
with discussion of similar Guidelines on the same topics that might be produced by
the Member States or even by other agencies (for instance, the OECD DAC). Such
discussions should aim at two outcomes:
– in the first instance, improving the Commission Guidelines by enriching them with
the experience and lessons from the best practices of other MS;
– in a longer perspective, replace them with a new EU handbook agreed by and
drawing on the experiences and expertise of the MS. It is important that the drafting
of this manual draws fully on the TCB experience of the Commission and MS.
R5.3.4 – IR 1 and 2.
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2 See under 2.2 of annex 3.
R5.3.5 Take responsibility for the regular and frequent updating by the MS of the DAC data-
base (the TCBDB).
(Based on Section 2.3 and Annex 6 )
The Doha Development Agenda Trust Fund pays for the TCBDB which is managed by
the OECD DAC. It includes data on commitments registered in the Doha Ministerial
Declaration, and their implementation, and aims to enhance the effectiveness of TCB
interventions through sharing of information leading to greater co-ordination and
coherence. Unfortunately the TCBDB is far from comprehensive, owing to the failure of
a number of donors, including a number of MS, to keep it up to date with their various
programmes. It is also insufficiently precise due to the number of activities recorded
as unspecified, both on the MS and on the Commission side. The working group
should impress upon the participants the importance of full utilisation of this poten-
tially valuable resource, and should monitor it.
A similar effort should be made with the database of evaluations (see Recommenda-
tion 5.1.3) currently being developed by the Group of Heads of Evaluation Services of
the EU; its coverage is not limited to TCB but since it uses the DAC codes it is potentially
an interesting source of information on a large variety of evaluated TCB projects and
programmes of the Commission and the MS.
R5.3.5 – Priority 3; IR 1.
5.4 Other recommendations
R5.4.1 In the Delegations and MS country or regional Representations, re-organise responsi-
bilities to facilitate more systematic exchanges of views, information and experience in
both directions.
(Based on conclusion 1)
In the Delegations and MS Representations responsibility for trade-related activities
seldom falls under a single person or section. A traditional division of responsibilities
consists of one person in charge of following the economy and trade in general along
with sector sections corresponding to the main entry points for the programming of
assistance: transport, rural development, education, private sector development, and
so on. Nearly all these sections have activities that in one way or another may have TCB
implications or a specific TCB component. This is obvious in the case of private sector
development but could be equally important in the agricultural or rural development
sectors where there may be an SPS component. The separation of these activities
within the donor representations is often accompanied by an absence or low degree of
communication and transmission of information between each other, and this is re-
flected in the donor-partner co-ordination groups that usually copy these structures.
It is therefore recommended that among Delegations and MS representations there is a
recurrent exchange of views and information to take stock and maintain awareness of
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the implications of different TCB activities so that internal co-ordination is improved.
R5.4.1 – Priority 3. IR 1.
R5.4.2 In every trade agency, department or service a person or group should keep develop-
ment issues in view, and similarly in every development agency, department or service
a person or a group should keep trade issues in view, and these persons or groups
should liaise with each other.
(Based on conclusion 1)
This recommendation is meant to address the lack of awareness and understanding of
trade issues by development people and vice versa. Structuring this approach could
build upon the experience of the Commission at HQ level: in DG TRADE a unit has been
set up that deals with multilateral and development issues. Similarly in AIDCO a unit
deals with trade issues. DGs DEV and RELEX also have a liaison person for trade issues.
A complementary recommendation is that within each MS and the Commission the
identified persons or groups should be registered on the website of the Joint Trade and
Development Expert Group, which could serve as a source of information and a discus-
sion forum for them. Since it is evident that not all of them could attend the meetings
of the Joint Trade and Development Experts Group it is recommended that participants
in the meetings of the Group systematically organise feedback to these persons or
groups in their respective administrations.
R5.4.2 – Priority 3; IR 1.
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